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 Abstract 
The capitalist democracies of western Europe and the U.S. have developed extensive social 
programs, based on the principle of solidarity, that provide assistance to the destitute, the 
unemployed, the sick, the disabled, and the elderly. Due in part to growing levels of spend-
ing on these solidarity programs that may threaten financial solvency in some of these coun-
tries and in part to a growing belief that social programs should help people work and 
achieve self-sufficiency, these countries have implemented “work activation” policies that 
try to encourage, entice, and cajole physically-able people to work. Experience implement-
ing such work activation policies now suggests that policy can emphasize the relatively new 
goal of work activation while still achieving the traditional social purpose of solidarity pro-
grams by greatly reducing poverty. The aim of this paper is to review the experiences of the 
U.S. and selected European nations in attempting to balance solidarity with work activation 
by discussing both the components of an ideal work activation system and the problems 
these systems often encounter. The problems examined include too few jobs, recessions, 
low wages, and disconnected adults. The overarching purpose of the paper is to find a bal-
ance between the goals of social solidarity and work activation. 
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Introduction 
Capitalism has its flaws, not the least of which are inconsistency in providing jobs for 
everyone who wants to work and indifference to people who cannot or are not expected 
to work. A capitalist system based entirely on markets, profit, and freedom will leave 
behind those who, for whatever reason, cannot find jobs or who cannot produce value in 
the labor market. 
A sparkling achievement of the European and American capitalist systems is that 
they have, each in their own manner, figured out a host of ways to help these left behind 
groups. The word “solidarity” may be a little hackneyed today, but the development of 
social programs that brought a human face to the “malign effects” of capitalism, as Tre-
asury Secretary Henry Morgenthau put it at the Bretton Woods Conference, has been a 
vitally important development in human history.2 The essence of the human face of so-
lidarity is the promise that, in addition to help from family and community, government 
will help those left behind to achieve a decent living standard even though they cannot, 
or in some cases choose not to, work. Solidarity is expressed in programs that provide 
cash and in-kind benefits to the elderly, the disabled and sick, the unemployed, and the 
destitute. 
All the Western democracies have developed extensive and generous programs that 
help these troubled groups. The programs vary from nation to nation, but taken as a 
whole they are the most successful programs ever devised by national governments to 
help the troubled. But alas, in the last two or three decades these programs have come 
under threat by a perfect storm that includes international competition for jobs, techno-
logical innovations and efficiency-oriented business practices that are making it difficult 
for the unskilled to qualify for jobs, historic changes in family composition, and aging 
of their populations leading to increased pressure on public pension systems and health 
expenditures. This perfect storm not only increases the costs imposed on governments 
by their solidarity programs but also constitutes a threat to the tax base by which soli-
darity programs are maintained. These two factors, in turn, represent a direct threat to 
the financial integrity of the government budgets of most or all of the Western democra-
cies – if not now, then soon. 
One of the most important responses to the perfect storm goes by the name, in 
Europe at least, of “work activation.” Although the details vary from country-to-
country, the general idea of activation is that policy should encourage more people to 
work by providing them with incentives, both positive and negative, to do so.  
Thus, the social programs in all these countries serve the common broad purpose of 
achieving solidarity with those who can’t work, those who can’t find jobs, and the desti-
tute; they all find ways to balance solidarity with self-sufficiency and work; and, most 
important for my purposes here, they all seem to be evolving toward a greater emphasis 
on personal effort, economic independence of individuals and families, and a higher 
Balancing Work and Solidarity in the Western Democracies 
 
Page 10 
share of their adults working.3 After reviewing the importance of work, the ways that 
nonwork is possible and sometimes even encouraged by the Western democracies, and 
the specific programs some of the Western Democracies have mounted to encourage 
work, I describe what I deem to be the important elements of an ideal, work-based capi-
talist system that balances solidarity with individual responsibility. I then turn to a dis-
cussion of several problems that are evident in the work-based approaches that are now 
such a notable feature of social policy in both the U.S. and the western European and 
Scandinavian countries, concluding that research and international comparisons and 
learning should play a key role in helping the Western democracies and other nations 
address the perfect storm that now threatens. 
A word is in order about my perspective. I worked with Republicans on the Ways 
and Means Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives that wrote the initial and 
most of the final draft of the 1996 welfare reform law. Since enactment of the 1996 re-
forms, and especially since I left the House and assumed a position at the Brookings 
Institution, I have studied and frequently written about the reforms and their effects.4 
The 1996 law is the primary example of work activation in U.S. national policy. The 
law and associated legislation, as we will see, are a combination of tough provisions 
designed to encourage benefit recipients to work and kinder and gentler policies that 
could bring welfare recipients into the mainstream by helping them find a job, helping 
them with child care, giving them generous wage supplements through the income tax 
code, ensuring medical care for their children (and now, since enactment of recent 
health legislation, for the mothers as well), and in general achieve what Europeans call 
economic and perhaps even social inclusion. However, everything depends on work. 
Unless former welfare recipients – as well as other low-skill workers who never joined 
the welfare rolls – work close to full time, their families could be worse off than if they 
had stayed on welfare. Moreover, there are many important issues about how the fifty 
states are implementing welfare reform, the import of which is to raise questions about 
basic issues of fairness and solidarity.5 In recent Congressional testimony, for example, 
I raised critical questions about whether states were providing adequate levels of cash 
support to destitute families that were having trouble finding work during the Great Re-
cession.6 The American work activation system is far from perfect and should be sub-
jected to the same careful scrutiny by Congress and the Administration as it has re-
ceived from researchers and policy analysts.7 
In short, although I have been a strong supporter of work activation policy in the 
U.S., I have tried to recognize and analyze its inherent problems. I intend to deal forth-
rightly with the problems as well as the achievements of U.S. activation policy in this 
paper. After studying activation policy in the European nations, I have concluded that 
both the U.S. and Europe face many of the same problems – and have a lot to learn from 
each other. This paper, written primarily from an American perspective, is a small step 
in that direction. 
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Jobs, Jobs, Jobs8 
Both America and Europe face a new version of the central problem of reconciling capi-
talism with solidarity. The problem is how to keep work rates high without chaining 
people to a machine or check-out counter and without making welfare, unemployment, 
or sickness and disability benefits so stingy that suffering abounds. 
The Importance of Work 
Why is work the central issue? The advantages of work to individuals and society are 
copious. One advantage is that people need work to keep their bodies and minds from 
atrophying. Both traditional wisdom (“Idle hands are the devil’s workshop”) and high-
quality research show that people who work are healthier, happier, and richer than their 
non-working counterparts.9 
An especially egregious outcome of idle hands is that nonwork can be habit forming. 
One of the most important studies of welfare in the U.S., performed by LaDonna 
Pavetti, examined the duration of spells on welfare in the 1980s and earlier.10 The main 
finding was that at any given moment, 65 percent of the adults (mostly mothers) on wel-
fare were in the midst of spells that would eventually, counting repeat spells, last eight 
years or more. The study – and a similar study of poverty spells by David Ellwood and 
Mary Jo Bane of Harvard – was used frequently by supporters of the 1996 welfare re-
form legislation with the argument that welfare was, in effect, like a virus that caused 
the disease of dependency. And it would require strong medicine to cure this disease. 
Another important finding of the Pavetti study was that many people who joined the 
welfare rolls used the program as its originators intended. Typically, they entered during 
a period when they were down on their luck, often following job loss or divorce, stayed 
a year or so, and then left for work or marriage, many never to return. Again, the find-
ings on poverty spells from Ellwood and Bane, featuring a mixture of short spells, long 
spells, and frequent returns to poverty, were strikingly similar to Pavetti’s findings on 
welfare spells. 
The finding that welfare caseloads contain a mixture of people who get off quickly 
and people who stay a long time and often return to the rolls highlights a problem that 
must be faced by social programs in Europe and the U.S. – even if most people do the 
right thing most of the time, there are a significant number of people who do not. I am 
not proposing that the world can be divided into ambitious people and lazy people. 
Rather, people fall along a continuum in the intensity with which they pursue independ-
ence – and people’s location on the continuum can change over time as their circum-
stances change. Generous social programs bear the moral hazard of moving people 
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along the continuum in the direction of dependency.11 It seems certain that this stark 
fact is universal and will never change. We’re talking here about human nature. 
At the other end of continuum from those with idle hands are those who go to bed 
late and get up early to make something of themselves and to create a future of accom-
plishment and economic security. Few human drives are as powerful as the drive to 
have productive work and to achieve financial security. Modern technology-based eco-
nomies allow a much greater range for the expression of talent and preparation than 
either agricultural economies with their need for backbreaking labor or industrial eco-
nomies with their emphasis on repetitive labor and routines. Economists Harry Holzer 
and Robert Lerman, responding to the constant harping on the U.S. “hourglass econ-
omy” with a shrinking middle class and supposed rapid growth of low-skilled jobs with 
low wages, have emphasized the continuing importance of middle-skill jobs that have 
both decent wages and opportunities for advancement.12 According to the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS), middle-skill jobs constituted nearly half of all jobs in 2006. 
These jobs typically require some post-high school education or training but not a four-
year degree and often not even a two-year degree. These middle-skill positions, which 
BLS projects will comprise 45 percent of all job openings over the next decade, pay 
between $30,000 and $60,000 a year, often have employee benefits, and usually open 
opportunities for advancement and often for starting small businesses. 
Another advantage of work for individuals is that people who work have a foot on 
the ladder to success. All of the Western democracies have lots of low-wage jobs that 
are generated by their economies, and critics have often been dismissive of these “dead-
end” jobs.13 During the American welfare reform debate of 1995-96, Democratic mem-
bers of Congress and editorial page writers often disparaged “dead-end, hamburger flip-
ping” jobs.14 Similar criticisms have been voiced by European analysts.15 This criticism 
was always somewhat off the mark because it ignored the huge achievement made by 
many people without work experience and headed toward a life of dependency who 
learned how to hold down a job – any job. In almost every case, these “dead-end” jobs, 
when combined with government benefits for low-income workers, would make work-
ers and their families better off financially – provided they worked close to full time – 
than if they had stayed on welfare.16 Equally important, even lousy jobs can lead to bet-
ter jobs and unskilled workers increase their odds of getting better jobs if they have a 
good work record. If nothing else, even low-wage jobs teach the importance of being on 
time, following directions, being courteous to customers, getting along with co-workers, 
and so forth. 
The advantages of increasing the number of citizens who work are as great to gov-
ernment as they are to individuals. Governments survive on taxes and the ultimate 
source of taxes is work. More workers mean more taxes. Fewer workers mean lower tax 
revenues and higher social expenditures.17 Nonwork often imposes two costs on gov-
ernment – one cost in lost taxes and a second cost in additional social benefits. 
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But a more fundamental advantage of work to government brings us back to solidar-
ity. The Western Democracies have a long and distinguished history of creating oppor-
tunity for their citizens and for immigrants. In the U.S., before the War on Poverty of 
the mid-1960s, the major role of government in promoting work and opportunity was 
keeping order and paying for public education. It is striking to recall that when the War 
on Poverty began in the mid-1960s, in direct contrast with the tradition of generous wel-
fare programs already underway in Europe, the American federal government had very 
modest social policy (unemployment and pension programs were the exception). No 
Head Start, no Food Stamps, no Medicare, no Medicaid, no Earned Income Tax Credit, 
virtually no housing programs, very modest education and training programs (other than 
those for the military), and so forth. But President Johnson’s domestic war not only ex-
panded the federal role in fighting poverty and expanding opportunity, but put the na-
tion on a path that subsequently grew into a superhighway. In 1968 the federal and state 
governments together spent about $16.1 billion or less than 2 percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) on means-tested programs (i.e., below some minimum income cutoff for 
eligibility); by 2004, means-tested spending had increased to $583 billion or a little less 
than 5 percent of GDP.18 Although there is no comparable data series after 2004, federal 
budget documents show that means-tested spending exceeded $700 billion by 2008, 
again about 5 percent of GDP.19 Thus, in either 2004 or 2008 government spending on 
means-tested programs was about 270 percent greater as a percent of GDP than it had 
been in 1968. 
Similarly, other Western democracies spend considerable sums on social programs, 
some of it intended to promote work preparation and opportunity.20 A substantial por-
tion of this money, varying from country to country, is intended to help the poor, the 
unemployed, and the disabled simply maintain their health and welfare, but much of the 
money is aimed explicitly at boosting development, skills, and opportunity – in other 
words, as investments in preparation for work and independence by helping people sei-
ze the abundant opportunities on offer by our respective capitalist economies. A recent 
study estimates that the U.S. federal government alone spends around $750 billion an-
nually on programs that promote economic opportunity such as employer work subsi-
dies, homeownership, savings and investment incentives, education and training, and 
others.21 I am not aware of a similar analysis for European nations, but it seems reason-
able to believe that the figure for Western Europe would be similar to the impressive 
figure for the U.S. 
Of course, in the U.S. and most European nations, governments below the national 
level also play a vital role in programs designed to promote work and opportunity.22 The 
investment that has throughout American history produced the greatest payoff to gov-
ernment and the entire society is public education.23 In 2008, the nation spent nearly 
$507 billion on public elementary and secondary education. This figure breaks down to 
well over $10,000 per pupil, an increase of 60 percent in dollars adjusted for inflation 
since 1985.24 States and localities pay for about 92 percent of public education. In addi-
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tion, states pay a substantial fraction of cash welfare, Medicaid, and a host of other so-
cial programs, many of which are designed to promote opportunity and some of which 
support low-income working families. So federal, state, and local governments all real-
ize the importance of work and opportunity and they place their biggest bets on pro-
grams explicitly designed to promote opportunity. 
Ways Not to Work 
If work and the opportunity to prepare for work are so important to both individuals and 
government, it would seem natural for individuals to avidly pursue work and advance-
ment and for governments to give individuals all the help and support they need to do 
so. An irreverent graduate student once remarked that the university was the place 
where man first discovered it was possible to live without working. Perhaps, but the 
Western democracies have discovered many ways for people, including whole families, 
to live without working. A major argument of this paper is that, due to a perfect storm 
of converging factors that include government deficits and evolving views on personal 
responsibility, all or nearly all of the Western democracies have decided to rebalance 
their social policies in order to reduce or at least contain spending on social programs by 
placing a greater emphasis on work.25 If Europe and the U.S. want to aggressively pro-
mote work, a good place to begin is by reflecting on modern ways not to work. 
Labor Force Participation of Women 
The Western democracies must come to terms with five sluices through which potential 
workers leave the labor market on a regular basis, three of their own creation. The first, 
easily dispensed with because the data are so clear, is women. Not so many years ago, 
there was a colorful argument in the U.S. and Europe about whether a woman’s place 
was in the home. A large majority of men and many women held that it was. Traditions 
are not always wonderful. But beginning at least by the 1960s,26 the women’s move-
ment established a loud and effective voice for women’s equality, a major part of which 
was economic independence from men. In addition to this cultural change in attitudes 
about women’s employment, economic necessity drove women into the labor force be-
cause changes in post-industrial economies reduced the share of males earning enough 
to sustain a family at the standard of living to which they were rapidly becoming accus-
tomed. In addition, the rise in divorce and non-marital births often left mothers and their 
children in difficult financial circumstances.27 
Whatever the cause, over the last half century or so, women – including those with 
young children – have flooded into the labor force. In the U.S., for example, the share of 
women with jobs increased from about 40 percent of all adult women in 1960 to about 
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66 percent in 2009.28 In the Netherlands, only a little more than 30 percent of adult 
women were employed as late as 1979, but by 2009, after almost continual increases for 
three decades, nearly 70 percent of Dutch females were employed, a record for Europe 
and North America.29 Additionally, Germany and the U.K. now have female employ-
ment-to-population ratios of well over 60 percent. The Western democracies have al-
ready enriched themselves, strengthened their pension systems, and struck a blow for 
opportunity and equality by creating social and political conditions that have opened the 
door – virtually all the way – to increased female employment.  
Programs for the Elderly 
A second source of encouragement to leave the labor market is retirement policy. One 
of the great achievements of the Western democracies, beginning with Germany in 
1889, has been the creation of retirement programs that provide a guaranteed income to 
the elderly. Equally important for evolving views on who should be expected to work, 
all the Western nations created their retirement programs when life expectancy was 
much shorter than it is today. As people live longer, of course, they have more years in 
which to draw retirement benefits, thereby boosting costs. As health science, nutrition, 
and other factors extend longevity, actuarial tables are trumped and policymakers dis-
cover that prolonging life has budget impacts. In the roughly half century since 1960, 
life expectancy has jumped by almost a decade in Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., 
the U.S., and other nations.30 Some Western governments, as if to aggravate the unex-
pected costs of the ever advancing average age of death, retooled their retirement pro-
grams to allow early retirement. Unfortunately, when given a choice between a guaran-
teed income (and usually other benefits as well, especially health insurance) without 
work and a somewhat higher income with work, millions choose the nonwork option. 
Today, given the aging population in all the Western democracies, relatively fewer 
workers are paying for the retirement benefits of relatively more retirees. In the U.S., for 
example, for every retired worker eligible for Social Security there were 42 workers in 
1940, 16 in 1950, and 3.3 today. By 2050, it is expected that there will be only 2 work-
ers for every 1 retiree.31 Given the pay-as-you-go nature of modern retirement pro-
grams, the present course is unsustainable on financial grounds alone. Many of the 
Western democracies have already increased their age of retirement and made other 
adjustments in their retirement programs and there certainly will be further reforms in 
the future. One effect of these reforms has already been to bring some “elderly” people 
back into the labor force, a move that can be expected to expand. In the Netherlands, for 
example, the employment-to-population ratio for those between ages 55 and 64 in 1986 
was 25.5; by 2009 the ratio had leaped to 52.6, in large part because of deliberate gov-
ernment policy aimed at increasing employment among those over age 55.32 
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Programs for the Destitute 
Welfare, the third sluice and perhaps the most controversial, is nonetheless another great 
achievement of the Western democracies. As Hobbes would have it, life in the state of 
nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”33 But the Western democracies, 
more or less for the first time in history, developed a range of welfare benefits to offset 
the “nasty, brutish, and short” part of the Hobbes dictum by helping the destitute, in-
cluding the elderly who until the modern era had suffered the highest poverty rates be-
cause their ability to work declined. In all the Western democracies, these welfare bene-
fits came to be seen as entitlements, a legal right, enforceable by law. Solidarity in some 
cases seemed to trump personal responsibility. 
But it soon became clear that generous benefits induce generous leisure in some peo-
ple.34 It is no coincidence that every Western democracy has taken action to counteract 
the tendency of welfare programs to support nonwork.35 First, some countries have re-
duced welfare benefits, simultaneously reducing the moral hazard of welfare and mak-
ing it more difficult to live without working. Second, all have strengthened the require-
ments for benefit recipients to work or prepare for work. As we will see in more detail 
below, these provisions – usually referred to as “active labor market policies” in Europe 
– can be shown to have had their intended effects in many countries, but benefit cuts 
and work requirements that force people off benefit programs could violate the solidar-
ity principle and for this reason are almost always controversial. Even so, at the moment 
the energy seems to be with work requirements and personal responsibility in both the 
U.S. and across Europe. Third, most countries have provided positive incentives to sup-
port work by luring people off welfare. Perhaps the most common work incentive is 
wage subsidies, often through the tax code.36 
The concern that the offer of welfare benefits can capture people who are fully capa-
ble of working is based on more than sociological theory. The classic view of econo-
mists is that you get more of what you pay for, including leisure. To put it crudely, if 
you pay people not to work, some of them will accept the offer. For those who prefer 
empirical evidence, consider the case of the U.S. After the welfare reform law of 1996 
was enacted, the rolls fell from around 4.8 million families in 1995 to 2.3 million fami-
lies by 2000 and 1.9 million families by 2006.37 Studies of families leaving welfare in 
several states show that at any given moment, about 60 percent of those leaving the rolls 
were employed and over the year after leaving, about 70 percent had held a job.38 Si-
multaneously, the poverty rate for black children and children in female-headed families 
fell to their lowest level ever.39 
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Programs for the Unemployed 
Benefit programs for the unemployed are the fourth potential drain on employment. The 
principles upon which unemployment programs are constructed are widely accepted. 
Almost everyone in Europe and America agrees that people who lose their job through 
no fault of their own – often due to company downsizing or closure, inevitable and 
permanent problems with capitalist economies – should receive government help. The 
justification for public help is often strengthened by the fact that many nations base 
their unemployment program at least in part on insurance principles. Thus, workers, 
employers, or both pay into a government-maintained account out of which worker 
benefits are paid if they become unemployed through no fault of their own. These pro-
grams are public in the dual sense that the payments, whether made by employers or by 
employees, are required by government policy and because the money in the accounts is 
often not sufficient to pay all the benefits required, in which case many nations use tax-
supported benefits to pay the difference. The public nature of unemployment programs 
once again reinforces the solidarity principle, both because public dollars are used in 
most programs and because the entire approach is based on what amounts to creating a 
pool of funds from a portion of the wages of all workers and using the pool to help 
those who lose their jobs. 
It would seem reasonable to treat the unemployed and the able-bodied on welfare dif-
ferently. By definition, the unemployed have proven themselves capable of finding, 
qualifying for, and engaging in work. None of these three achievements are necessarily 
true about adults on welfare. Nonetheless, if the U.S. experience is any indication, a 
very substantial fraction of the adults on welfare are capable of finding job openings 
(perhaps with help from government programs), interviewing for a job, and actually 
working. Yet again, it is useful to think of people on unemployment and welfare pro-
grams as falling along a continuum that ranges from complete dependency and inability 
to hold down a job to job ready and fully capable of steady work. The latter, of course, 
are easier to help get off welfare or unemployment. 
However, economic theory implies that if people without jobs are given benefits, 
they might stay unemployed longer and use more government-provided or employer-
provided benefits. Indeed, in one of the first models of the impact of unemployment 
benefits on employment rates and benefit receipt, in 1977 Dale Mortensen held that un-
employment payments would lengthen unemployment spells. His model also predicted 
that those not covered by unemployment payments would leave an unemployment spell 
sooner and those who are covered would tend to increase their rate of leaving unem-
ployment as they approach the exhaustion of benefits.40 Bruce Meyer of the University 
of Chicago, in a detailed review of the empirical literature on these and related issues, 
found that on the whole studies tend to confirm the Mortensen model.41 Similarly, there 
is experimental evidence showing that the length of time workers are unemployed and 
the length of time they draw unemployment benefits can be reduced by both cash re-
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wards for finding another job quickly and job search programs that help the unemployed 
find work and enforce work search rules. Equally important, job search experiments in 
the U.S. produced modest evidence that the unemployed are better off because their 
earnings increase when they quickly find work and government and employers are bet-
ter off because the savings in payment of unemployment benefits exceed expenditures 
on the job search program.42 More recently, Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ayşegűl 
Şahın report that research shows there is a “strong positive relationship” between the 
maximum duration of unemployment benefits and the duration of unemployment 
spells.43 
The point is not to conclude that unemployment benefits should be eliminated be-
cause they lengthen spells of unemployment. However, programs that require benefit 
recipients to look for work reduce the length of unemployment spells and often save 
government money. Given survey data showing that the average unemployed worker 
searches for employment only 12 minutes per day in Europe and only 41 minutes per 
day in the U.S., it is clear that neither the European nor American workforce programs 
are very insistent about job search. The implication is that more serious job search re-
quirements could further reduce time between jobs.44 Lest it be thought that shortening 
unemployment spells is not a major concern during recessions and Great Recession, it 
should be realized that last year, with unemployment hovering around 10 percent in the 
U.S., an average of over 4 million people a month found jobs.45 Capitalist labor markets 
are dynamic – even during recessions. 
Sickness and Disability Programs 
A fifth drain on employment is policies that allow people with disabilities or sickness to 
leave the labor force, sometimes temporarily and sometimes permanently. All of the 
nations we focus on here have extensive policies that provide income to individuals who 
have physical or mental problems that limit work. The politics of limiting these pro-
grams – usually by offering incentives for returning to work or by requiring stronger 
evidence of an actual sickness or disability that inhibits work – can be risky, as those 
supporting the limitations can be charged with refusing to extend a helping hand to the 
sick and disabled. Such a charge often begs the question of whether everyone who 
qualifies for disability benefits truly has a condition that is serious enough to justify 
taxing fellow workers to provide the person with a benefit.46 
Richard Burkhauser of Cornell University has assembled interesting evidence from 
the U.S. on this point. Based on the National Health Interview Survey, Burkhauser 
shows that the percentage of representative samples of Americans who told interviewers 
they were in fair or poor health remained virtually constant year after year between 
1997 and 2006. Given this result, it is no surprise that when asked whether they had a 
health condition that limited their ability to work, there is a similar stability over the 
period. And yet over this identical period, the disability caseload of the Supplemental 
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Security Income and the Social Security Disability Insurance programs increased every 
year.47 Over the decade, the combined rolls increased by about 25 percent, well over 
twice the rate of population growth.48 This example shows that enrollment in disability 
programs is based on more than the actual disabling conditions experienced by recipi-
ents.  
The suggestion from Burkhauser’s work, of course, is that disability programs could 
be tightened up by requiring better evidence that an actual work-limiting disability is 
present or by increasing the incentives for people who have mild and moderate disabili-
ties to try to work. A clear example showing that enrollment in disability programs is 
responsive to policy changes is provided by the Netherlands. After the Disability Insur-
ance rolls rose from 860,000 in 1995 to 982,000 in 2003, at which point over 13 percent 
of the work force (aged 15-64) was on disability, the Dutch government introduced re-
forms in 2006  that imposed stricter rules on the definition of disability. By 2009, the 
rolls were down to 765,000, a decline of 20 percent since 2003 and by over 10 percent 
in just the three years after the reforms were introduced.49 Although experience in sev-
eral countries shows that the politics of reducing disability rolls is often politically 
risky,50 it can be expected that disability programs will be on the table for curtailments 
as financial reality continues to shape the spending programs of the Western democra-
cies. 
All of these programs through which workers drain from the productive economies 
of the Western democracies are costly to their respective governments, employers, and 
taxpayers. Even so, nearly all the U.S. and European programs have long and honorable 
pedigrees, and all serve to mitigate the age-old income problems of human societies, 
and in particular Henry Morgenthau’s “malign effects” of capitalism. To provide a con-
crete idea of the characteristics of these programs, the Appendix contains an overview 
of selected programs in Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. that provide 
assistance to the destitute (welfare programs; Appendix Tables 1, 2 and 3), the disabled 
(Appendix Tables 4 and 5), and the unemployed (Table 2 below) . Without question, the 
programs reviewed in the Appendix, and similar programs in other western European 
and Scandinavian countries, relieve a lot of misery. But the moral hazards and financial 
costs are undeniable. As is so often the case with government, the key to policymaking 
is finding the golden mean, that ever-changing sweet spot in the balance between soli-
darity and personal responsibility. 
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Success in Promoting Work while Achieving Solidarity 
If the solidarity programs of the Western democracies have been as successful as I have 
claimed, we should be able to find evidence of this success in both their ability to re-
duce poverty and increase work rates. In addition, we should expect to see increases in 
labor force participation in recent years as a result of the various activation policies im-
plemented in most western European countries. 
Poverty 
Of the many general indicators of well-being used to measure the success of social pro-
grams in the Western democracies, none is used as frequently or to better effect than 
poverty rates. Comparisons of the European and Scandinavian countries with the U.S. 
are complicated by the fact that the official poverty measures of the former are funda-
mentally different than the latter. More specifically, the U.S. official definition is an 
absolute measure, meaning that the threshold against which poverty is measured 
changes only with inflation over time but not with growth of the economy or of personal 
income. By contrast, the typical European and Scandinavian measures are relative 
measures of poverty. The primary difference between absolute and relative measures is 
that relative measures reflect changes in the poverty threshold relative to some defini-
tion of changes over time in the average income of the respective nations. OECD pov-
erty measures, for example, are often given as the share of the population with incomes 
below 40 percent, 50 percent, or 60 percent of median income in the various nations. 
Except during times of recession, thresholds of relative poverty increase more rapidly 
than absolute thresholds, and are therefore more difficult for low-income families to rise 
above – or for policy initiatives to push them above. 
Figure 1 provides definitive evidence of the effectiveness of all four countries in us-
ing policy to reduce poverty rates. Life in the state of nature, so to speak, reveals that in 
Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S., between one-third and one-quarter of 
the populations would live in poverty were it not for government-provided benefits. But 
because of the solidarity policies of these nations, poverty is reduced by an average of 
60 percent. Another important generalization from Figure 1 concerns work activation 
and poverty. As we will see, especially by the mid-2000s, all four nations were empha-
sizing work activation policies. Yet their solidarity programs continued to be effective 
in substantially reducing poverty. 
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Figure 1
Relative Poverty Rate Before and After Taxes and Transfers in Germany, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States in the mid-2000s
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Note: Poverty threshold used here is 50 percent of median income; poverty rates are based on median household income in the respective countries.
Source: OECD Stat Extracts (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=POVERTY).  
Although only Germany has a higher poverty rate before taxes and transfers than the 
U.S., American solidarity policies nonetheless reduce before-tax and before-transfer 
poverty much less than the other countries. Based on OECD data using a relative pov-
erty measure (50 percent of median household income), Figure 2 shows the after-
transfers relative poverty rate in all four nations in the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. 
The U.S. rate is always at least 50 percent higher than the rate of any of the three Euro-
pean nations. 
Despite this difference, the U.S. has made important progress against poverty in the 
last three decades. Specifically, two groups have experienced notable declines in pov-
erty, both due in large part to changes in government policy. Expansions of Social Secu-
rity payments and the creation of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in 
1972 legislation greatly reduced poverty among the elderly. More specifically, using the 
official U.S. poverty measure, in the decade after 1968, poverty among the U.S. elderly 
fell by almost 45 percent to 14 percent and has continued to fall since, although at a 
slower rate. By 2008, the poverty rate among the elderly was 9.7 percent.51 Nearly all of 
the decline in elderly poverty is due to increased Social Security and SSI payments.52 
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Figure 2
Relative Poverty Rate after Taxes and Transfers in Germany, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States in the mid-1990s and mid-2000s
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The second group that experienced impressive declines in poverty was single mothers 
and their children. This group is especially important in the U.S. because poverty rates 
among single mothers and their children are so high. Anyone hoping to have major im-
pacts on poverty in the U.S. must have a plan that pays special attention to single moth-
ers. An example of such a plan was the 1996 welfare reform bill in the U.S. Immedi-
ately preceding and following passage of the welfare reform law, millions of mothers on 
welfare and eligible for welfare entered the labor force and found jobs. Between 1995 
and 1999 there was an unprecedented increase of more than 40 percent in the number of 
never-married mothers, the poorest of the poor, who found employment.53 As shown in 
Figure 3, in part due to this increased employment of never-married mothers, poverty 
among single mothers and their children fell substantially. Between the mid-1990s and 
2001, poverty among female-headed families fell by about one-third and reached its 
lowest level ever while poverty among married mothers who did not experience a major 
increase in employment held steady. Similarly, poverty among black children, who live 
disproportionately in female-headed families, reached its lowest level ever (not shown). 
This example demonstrates what is possible if government policy encourages and even 
pressures adults to go to work and then subsidizes the incomes of those who earn low 
wages. This chapter in the welfare-to-work saga ends on a high note, but additional 
chapters – perhaps with different results – are now being written. 
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Figure 3
Poverty in Female-Headed and Married-Couple Households with Children 
in the United States, 1974-2008
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Work 
An equally basic measure of the success of work activation policies is the employment-
to-population (E/P) ratio. By expressing the percentage of the entire adult population 
who hold jobs, the E/P ratio is the most useful measure of a nation’s success in maxi-
mizing employment. Consider the ratio for all workers and for female workers in Ger-
many, the Netherlands, the UK, the U.S. and the OECD average (Figures 4a and 4b re-
spectively). In Figure 4a we see that the trend over the last three decades in the E/P ratio 
is mostly upward for all four countries, especially since the mid-1980s. This upward 
direction is especially the case if we ignore the recession year of 2009. Between 1984 
and 2008, Germany experienced a 15 percent increase in the proportion of the popula-
tion with jobs, the U.K. experienced a 10 percent increase, and the Netherlands experi-
enced an astounding 52 percent increase. For all three countries, employment of females 
led the way with an increase equal to about twice the increase for the population as a 
whole.54 Although the U.S. fell off more than any other country after 1999, over the 
entire period the average yearly E/P ratio for the U.S. was 70.8, which was higher than 
the annual average for any other country. So steep was the U.S. decline, however, that 
by 2009 all three of the other countries – each of which started out below the U.S. – had 
surpassed the U.S. ratio. Nor is this impressive performance by the European countries 
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due entirely to the impacts of the recessions of 2001 and 2007, both of which seem to 
have hit the U.S. harder than the other countries. The Netherlands and the U.K. sur-
passed the U.S. in the early 2000s and remained higher every year thereafter. Even 
Germany, which was considerably below the U.S. almost every year after 1983 sur-
passed the U.S. in 2009. Something seems to be going on in Europe.  
Thus, the overall commitment to active workforce policies by both the U.S. and the 
European nations (see Table 2 below) appears to be paying off, especially in the case of 
women. The drop off for males and for the U.S. is worrying and difficult to understand, 
but if these nations are to continue boosting their E/P ratios, focusing their policies on 
males may be a good idea. 
The notable performance of the Netherlands, certainly the most dramatic increase in 
the E/P ratio of any nation over the last three decades, deserves careful study. Consider 
the data in Table 1, which is an updated version of a table in the indispensible book 
about the “Dutch Miracle” by Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck.55 Both Table 1 below 
and the table in the Visser/Hemerijck volume show the amazing economic progress the 
Netherlands has made and showing why the Netherlands provides an example of policy 
actions that can lead to strong GDP growth, increased employment, falling unemploy-
ment, and declining use of welfare, unemployment, and disability programs. The au-
thors are careful to point out that no two nations are the same, from which it follows 
that the policy mix leading to increased employment and declining reliance on solidarity 
programs should be expected to vary from nation to nation. Even so, a careful study of 
the Dutch case can provide clues to the type of reforms that can lead a nation out of 
what Esping-Andersen has characterized as “welfare without work.” 
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Figure 4a
Employment/Population Ratios for Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, 1979-2009
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Source: OECD Stat Extracts (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R)
Figure 4b 
Female Employment/Population Ratios for Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and OECD Countires, 1979-2009 
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Table 1 
Economic Performance of the Netherlands in Comparison 
with the European Union, 1991-2009 
     
Economic Measure 
Netherlands  
(percent) 
European Union  
(percent) 
GDP Growth (Average Annual Growth) 2.29 2.09 
Employment Growth (Average Annual 
Growth) 1.45 0.81 
Unemployment Growth (Average Annual 
Growth) -0.36 1.57 
Unemployment Rate (Average) 3.36 8.45 
Employment/Population Ratio (Average) 70.48 64.18 
      
Source: Author Analysis of OECD.statExtracts. See http://stats.OECD.org.   
Note: This table is an updated version of most of the measures summarized in A Dutch Miracle, Table 
1, p. 11. All figures are for Netherlands and OECD category EU 15 from 1991-2009 except for GDP, 
which is from 1991-2008; private consumption, which is from 1996-2009 and the EU figure is for the EU 
27 category, and the unemployment rate, which is from 2000-2008 and the EU figure is for the EU 
category. 
Visser and Hemerijck attribute the Dutch miracle to three critical types of reforms. First, 
through tough but ultimately successful negotiations between government, business, and 
labor unions, an agreement on wage moderation was reached. The moderation of wages 
was key because it allowed Dutch goods to be more competitive on the international 
market and because it allowed greater profitability margins for Dutch companies. Ac-
cording to the authors, there was nearly universal understanding among businesses, la-
bor leaders, and politicians that to achieve a higher level of investment and more jobs, 
“a higher level of profitability was required.”56 Second, government spending and taxa-
tion was too high. Thus, a wide array of policies designed to reduce spending on social 
programs were enacted over a period years. This included a freeze on benefit levels; an 
overhaul of unemployment benefits, especially by shortening the maximum period of 
benefit eligibility; and considerable tightening of disability and sickness programs, pri-
marily by stiffening the requirements for program qualification. Third, by lowering the 
minimum wage, focusing services and especially job search on lower skill workers, and 
reorganizing and improving the efficiency of the public employment service, the Neth-
erlands provided one of the most thorough and successful examples of European work 
activation policy. Table 1 attests to the success of these reforms. 
But no good deed goes unpunished. Visser and Hemerijck give a thorough account of 
the political consequences of these sweeping reforms, characterizing the political proc-
ess as one of reaching “unpleasant decisions” that had “painful consequences.”57 Not 
least of the painful consequences was a loss of seats in parliament by the two major 
Dutch political parties (the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats) who were 
“credited” with these reforms. Indeed, within a few years following the major reduc-
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tions in disability and sickness benefits, the Social Democrats lost one-third of their 
members; losses for the Christian Democrats were even greater58. It is impossible not to 
admire the kind of political courage required to enact these reforms. A comparison is 
instructive. As of this writing, the U.S. is in the midst of a deficit crisis that most ana-
lysts predict will eventually lead to bankruptcy of the federal government. The logic of 
the emergency requires federal policymakers to enact some mix of spending cuts and 
revenue increases. Yet neither party has had the political will and courage to seriously 
cut spending or increase revenues and the emergency continues to deepen. In this con-
text, the Dutch economic miracle appears to be a political miracle as well and leads to 
the question of whether the U.S. and many European nations will find the courage to 
reform their social programs along the trails blazed by the Dutch before they bankrupt 
themselves. 
Although the discussion in this section is too broad to allow conclusions about the ef-
fectiveness of work activation policies, my purpose has been more limited. I think the 
data on poverty and increasing labor force participation rates in the U.S. and Europe, 
combined with the results of the Dutch miracle summarized in Table 1, should provide a 
circumstantial case that implementing work activation policies can be compatible with 
declines in poverty rates and that modern solidarity policies are not incompatible with 
high work rates. Indeed, the Dutch example suggests that these reforms can be under-
taken in a manner that promotes economic growth while reducing government spending 
on social programs. 
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Components of a Strong Work Activation System 
If the overall picture of work activation policies and solidarity outcomes seems encour-
aging, the next goal of this paper is to examine the specific policies that, taken together, 
would constitute a strong system of work activation and work support that improves the 
balance between work activation and solidarity. Nearly all western European countries 
have experience with each of these elements of a strong work support system, so a lot 
about work activation policy is already known. But there is a lot left to learn about poli-
cies that can more effectively help people get and hold jobs while simultaneously im-
proving their economic circumstances. 
Work Preparation and Requirements 
As shown in Table 2, the U.S. and several western European nations have established 
programs that attempt to impose work requirements on recipients of welfare and unem-
ployment benefits. These programs are a central thrust of the effort in both Europe and 
the U.S. to implement active labor market policies. Nearly all the beneficiaries of these 
programs are out of work and the goal is to get as many of them as possible either back 
into jobs or into work for the first time (in the case of some of those receiving welfare 
benefits). Programs in the four nations are remarkably similar. Typically, recipients 
must register with an agency that either directly provides workforce services or makes 
arrangements with another agency to conduct the workforce program. All the programs 
seem to be mandatory in the sense that if the recipient does not follow whatever work 
preparation the agency requires, they are subject to sanctions, usually in the form of 
temporary benefit reductions. 
In the U.S., there is a large literature, both predating and following the 1996 welfare 
reform law, showing that work programs associated with welfare can result in signifi-
cant increases in employment and even in some cases save government money. An early 
study by Lawrence Mead, conducted in the late 1980s, provided strong evidence that 
work requirements could significantly boost work levels, despite frequently-sited barri-
ers such as lack of available jobs and lack of work experience used by critics as reasons 
welfare-to-work programs were destined to fail.59 Another important early study, pub-
lished in 1988 and based on large-scale studies of four state welfare-to-work programs 
involving thousands of recipients, found that welfare-to-work programs save money for 
federal, state, and local governments.60  
  
  Table 2   
  
Comparison of Selected Aspects of Work Expectations in Germany,                  
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States   
        
  Germany Netherlands  United Kingdom  United States1 
Provision (Unemployment  
Benefits II) 
(Social 
Assistance) 
(Job Seekers Allowance) (Unemployment 
Insurance) 
(TANF)2 
Behavioral Eligibility Criteria:       
Job Search Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Registration Yes Yes Yes Yes Varies by state 
Integration Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Varies by state 
Work Requirement - Varies by 
municipality 
Yes Yes Varies by state 
Action Plan Yes, every 6 months Varies by 
municipality 
Yes, update quarterly Varies by state Varies by state 
Interviews Initial Varies by 
municipality 
Yes, initial and quarterly Often Varies by state 
Confirmation of  
Circumstances 
- Varies by 
municipality 
Every 2 weeks Varies by state Varies by state 
Proof of Job Search - Varies by 
municipality 
Every 2 weeks Varies by state Varies by state 
Suitable Job Defined Yes Not explicit - Yes Varies by state 
Sanctions  10% initial and then 
10%-100% for 1.5-3 
months for repeat 
violations 
Yes, including 
loss of  
benefits;  
Varies by 
municipality 
100% for 2 weeks initial 
and then 100% for up to 
26 weeks 
Can include loss 
of benefit for 
several weeks 
Varies by state but all 
states use sanctions,  
some withhold part of 
benefit, some terminate 
entire benefit, especially 
for multiple offenses 
         
Source: Herwig Immervoll, "Minimum-Income Benefits in OECD Countries: Policy Design, Effectiveness, and Challenges," Paris: Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010, Table 6. 
1 The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and housing programs also have work requirements but they are relatively modest and 
 tend not to be enforced. 
2 Although state policies on work and sanctions vary greatly, all states require registration and job search and all or nearly all have work programs  
 that include all of the characteristics listed in this table. However, the degree to which states aggressively implement their own policies also  
 varies greatly.   
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Figure 5
Employment-Population Ratio for Single, Married, and Never-Married Mothers 
in the United States, 1985-2009
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Despite the hopeful evidence from these early studies, the rapid rise in employment by 
single and never-married mothers during the welfare reform era of the mid-1990s was 
much greater than anyone had predicted (Figure 5). The major changes in welfare cre-
ated by the 1996 legislation were to require nearly all welfare recipients to meet work 
requirements, to require states to impose financial penalties in the form of benefit reduc-
tions on any recipients who did not meet the work requirements, to make it easier for 
states to impose financial penalties by ending the legal entitlement to cash welfare, and 
to impose a 5-year time limit on benefit receipt. The intent of the legislation was to 
shock the welfare system that had previously been lax on requiring recipients to find 
employment. Given that these changes came in a bundle, it is impossible to know which 
particular policy contributed to such a massive response (in conjunction with an ex-
panding economy and other programs, to be discussed below, that made low-wage work 
pay). There is little doubt, however, that the reforms demonstrate that government acti-
vation policies can dramatically increase employment, even for recipients who were 
previously considered to be incapable of finding and holding jobs. 
Such work-inducing programs are not confined to welfare. All four of the countries 
in Table 2 also have work requirements for workers drawing unemployment benefits. 
Of course, there are usually serious differences between the way a government program 
is described on paper and how it actually works in practice. To be effective, a work ac-
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tivation system must have a means of enforcing its requirements, the topic to which we 
now turn. 
Sanctions for Noncompliance 
Many policy analysts and program administrators in the U.S. argue that recipients of 
both welfare benefits and unemployment benefits sometimes fail to invest serious effort 
in trying to find or prepare for jobs.61 The survey data mentioned above showing that 
the average unemployed worker in Europe conducts job search for an average of 12 
minutes a day while unemployed U.S. workers search for 41 minutes a day makes the 
point. In the case of welfare recipients, it is not so much that they reject the importance 
of self sufficiency; rather they appear to sincerely want to work, but somehow do not 
get jobs or when they do they soon quit or get fired.62 In the case of the unemployed, 
who tend to be more job ready than welfare recipients, as we have seen there is good 
evidence that programs that give them incentives to find work or provide them with 
quality workforce services are successful in shortening unemployment spells. Conserva-
tive politicians often characterize unemployment insurance as “paying people not to 
work.” Consistent with this view, American scholar Bruce Meyer notes: “Unemploy-
ment Insurance is not a completely benign transfer; it affects claimants’ behavior.”63 
The point of work activation policy is to overcome the half-hearted response some un-
employed workers show to job search requirements. 
One way to overcome people’s reluctance to aggressively seek out work is to impose 
sanctions on those who do not meet work requirements. Programs that provide welfare 
or unemployment benefits can threaten to reduce or even eliminate benefits unless re-
cipients meet whatever work requirements authorities judge to be appropriate. The first 
thing to say about the use of such sanctions is that most of the capitalist democracies 
have policies that allow their workforce agencies to impose sanctions on recipients. 
Whether the program requiring work is a welfare program or an unemployment pro-
gram, recipients who do not meet the requirements for job preparation or job search can 
lose part or all of their benefits for noncompliance, at least on paper. 
The authors of the U.S. welfare reform law believed that sanctions were an important 
part of getting welfare recipients to work.64 As a result, they included a provision re-
quiring all states to reduce the welfare benefits of recipients who did not fully cooperate 
with the work requirement designed by the states. States were free to design their own 
system of sanctions, but the approach had to include benefit reductions. As it turned out, 
most states used a graduated system of benefit penalties, usually beginning with a loss 
of part of the benefit for a few months and then, if the recipient continued to be in viola-
tion of the work requirement, moving to a loss of more benefits and for longer periods. 
Balancing Work and Solidarity in the Western Democracies 
 
Page 32 
A total of 36 of the 50 states adopted policies that allowed them to eventually terminate 
the entire welfare check.65 
Some data on the actual use of sanctions are available for the U.S. and Germany. Ta-
ble 3 shows the use of sanctions in the TANF program in the U.S. every year between 
2000 and 2008. Each year states sanctioned between 5 percent and 7 percent of their 
entire caseload (first two columns); for between 3.4 and 4.5 percent of the caseload 
these sanctions were imposed for violations of work requirements. The seriousness of 
sanctions is indicated by the column on cases closed due to “work sanctions.” Of all the 
closed TANF cases, between 3.9 percent and 6.4 percent were closed each year because 
of work sanctions. It also appears that, over the period, states increased their use of “full 
check” sanctions that ended the entire welfare benefit. 
 
 
 Table 3  
 
Percentage of Cases Receiving a Sanction in the U.S. Temporary  
Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF), 2000-2008  
        
 Caseload Data1  Closed Cases Data (Closed Due To): 
Year 
Overall  
Sanction 
Work 
Sanction  
Federal 
Time Limit 
State 
Time Limit 
Work 
Sanction 
Employ- 
ment 
2000 6.1 3.5  0.0 N/A 3.9 19.7 
2001 6.3 3.9  0.0 N/A 4.5 19.4 
2002 7.2 4.5  2.2 0.8 4.2 17.2 
2003 6.9 4.3  1.1 0.8 4.2 17.9 
2004 5.6 3.5  1.1 0.9 6.4 18.7 
2005 5.8 3.6  1.0 0.9 6.1 19.2 
2006 5.6 3.4  1.2 0.8 5.6 20.9 
2007 5.7 4.1  1.5 0.7 5.4 22.1 
2008 5.2 3.9  1.8 0.6 6.0 19.6 
        
Source: HHS administrative data from Peter Germanis, e-mail message to author, June 21, 
2010. 
Note: States are required to submit both overall caseload data and data from their closed 
cases; data from both reports are presented here. 
1 Cases can be closed for many reasons including increased income from employment or  
 other sources, not participating in the work program, not cooperating when welfare officials  
 request information, not showing up for appointments, supplying inaccurate information, and 
 others. The work sanction data presented here include only direct violation of some aspect  
 of the work requirement. 
Information on sanctioning recipients in Germany shows a similar, albeit lower, rate of 
imposing financial penalties on those who do not follow the rules. After major reforms 
of their unemployment program in 2004, the unemployed were placed on the nation’s 
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cash welfare program after receiving 52 weeks of unemployment benefits, paid directly 
by employers.66 At that point, the German system makes no differentiation between 
welfare recipients and former unemployment recipients who have exhausted their 52 
weeks of regular benefits. Both the unemployment and welfare programs have work 
requirements, although data on sanctioning were available only for the welfare program. 
For this combined group, between 2.4 percent and 2.6 percent were sanctioned each 
year between 2006 and 2010 for not meeting the work requirement. The German system 
includes first sanctions, which are equal to 30 percent of the benefit, second sanctions 
equal to 60 percent of the benefit, and third sanctions which terminate the entire bene-
fit.67 Thus, like the U.S., the German system of sanctions includes the termination of the 
entire benefit, although available data does not separate out these full-check sanctions 
from partial sanctions. 
Sanctions appear to have played a relatively small role in the remarkable increase in 
employment in the Netherlands chronicled above. The Netherlands uses sanctions in the 
form of benefit reductions in its welfare programs, its unemployment program, and even 
its disability program. The sanctions increase in severity as the rule violation becomes 
more serious. Specifically, recipients get a 10 percent benefit reduction for 2 months for 
failing to meet any of several parts of the work requirements, a 20 percent reduction for 
4 months for insufficient job search, and complete termination of benefits for refusing 
suitable work. However, these sanctions appear to have been used in less than 1 percent 
of the cases.68  
Although the Dutch made sparing use of sanctions, the U.S. experience seems to in-
dicate that sanctions, as well as rewards, have an impact on recipients’ behavior. In ad-
dition to the impacts on benefit recipients who directly experience a sanction, the threat 
of sanctions could discipline the behavior of other recipients who may decide to meet 
requirements in order to avoid a sanction. It seems reasonable to conclude that sanctions 
are an important part of a demanding approach to getting the unemployed and welfare 
recipients back to work. But there is little evidence on how harsh sanctions have to be to 
influence behavior. If research showed that jobless benefit recipients respond well to 
mild sanctions, the use of sanctions that terminate benefits may be unnecessary. 
Moreover, research in the U.S. shows that those thrown off the welfare rolls by sanc-
tions experience a substantial drop in income and appear to face increased financial 
hardships. These hardships are not necessarily a reason for abandoning sanctions, but if 
sanctions lead to a major increase in hardships among these adults and children, the 
issue deserves more careful analysis. 
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Work Support System 
Until recently, America was quite appropriately known as “the great job machine.” 
However, beginning with the mild recession of 2001 and even more dramatically after 
the onset of the Great Recession that began in December 2007, the American job ma-
chine has blown a few gaskets. Even before the machine began to sputter, it had a fun-
damental problem. Millions of jobs generated by the machine paid low wages. As 
mothers began to leave welfare in hordes after the welfare reform legislation of 1996, 
they took jobs that averaged about $10 an hour (in today’s dollars).69 If the mothers 
worked 35 hours a week for 50 weeks a year at this wage, their annual income would be 
$15,750. In 2010, this amount is only slightly above the U.S. poverty line for a mother 
and two children, despite the fact that the poverty line is lower than the line in the west-
ern European and Scandinavian countries. In other words, even under the cramped defi-
nition of poverty used in the U.S., these mothers and their children would be barely 
above the poverty line if they had to rely exclusively on the mother’s earnings. If the 
poverty line were 50 percent or 60 percent of median income as frequently used by Eu-
rostat, the European Statistical Office, the mothers and their children would need even 
more income to be above the poverty line. 
So some substantial portion of the millions of poorly educated single mothers who in 
the past would have been likely to rely on welfare could now leave welfare or avoid it in 
the first place, work nearly full time, take care of their children and run their household, 
and still live in poverty. Solidarity this is not. The solution that America has devised, 
more or less deliberately, is to use both positive and negative incentives to lure or force 
these mothers into the work force and then to create a system of cash and in-kind pro-
grams that augment their income. Over a period of years beginning in roughly the mid-
1980s and continuing until the present day, both the federal and state governments have 
been creating new programs and modifying old programs so that they would provide 
more support to low-income working families. Policymakers were motivated, not sim-
ply by the desire to help working families avoid poverty, but also by the understanding 
that making sure workers can escape poverty strengthens the incentive to work. A sys-
tem based on the goal of “making work pay” boosts both income and work incentive. 
Figure 6 provides a good idea of how successful American policymakers were in 
creating a system of programs that boosted income and work incentive. Based on a stu-
dy conducted by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the bar graphs 
show how much money low-income working families would receive from the most im-
portant work support programs, first, as they existed in 1984 and, second, after all of 
them had been reformed or even created out of whole cloth, as they existed in 1999. 
Based on the actual characteristics of working families in the 1999 Current Population 
Survey, CBO modeled the benefits these families would receive under 1984 laws and 
then under 1999 laws. Under 1984 laws, working families would have received less 
than $6 billion in government work support benefits in 1999. But under 1999 laws, be-
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cause of the legislated expansions of the work support programs, CBO estimated that 
the same families would receive nearly $52 billion to augment their earnings in 1999. 
Clearly, between 1984 and 1999 there had been a work-support revolution, longer-
lasting and less dramatic perhaps than the welfare revolution of the mid-1990s, but no-
netheless vitally important to understanding the effects of welfare reform. 
 
 
Figure 6 
Support for Working Families in the United States Increases Dramatically, 1984 and 1999
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Source:  Congressional Budget Office, "Policy Changes Affecting Mandatory Spending for Low-Income Families Not Receiving Welfare," 1998.
 
Anyone who followed Congress between 1984 and 1999 as the work support programs 
were created or expanded could not doubt that elected officials fully realized they were 
taking steps to help low-income working families by making work pay. In the huge and 
partisan budget battle of 1990, for example, a bipartisan compromise was killed by 
House Democrats specifically because it did not help low-income working families 
enough.70 Leaders in the House then inserted an even bigger expansion of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), a program that provides cash income subsidies based on 
earnings to low-income families with children,71 than had been in the original bill. Gi-
ven that the first President Bush had featured an expansion of the EITC two years ear-
lier in his presidential campaign, and that he signed the final 1990 bill, this episode rein-
forces the fact that much of the legislation that led to expansion of the work support 
programs was bipartisan in conception and enactment.72 
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The treatment of low-income families by the U.S. tax code provides still more evi-
dence of the commitment of a series of federal congresses and presidents of both parties 
to helping low-income working families. One of the most impressive and far-reaching 
actions occurred as part of the sweeping reform of the federal tax code in 1986 under a 
Democratic House and a Republican Senate and president.73 In accord with the classic 
injunction of economists, the major achievement of the 1986 tax reform legislation was 
to broaden the tax base while reducing tax rates. Broadening the base refers to the 
amount of taxpayers’ income that became subject to the federal income tax but not to 
increasing the number of taxpayers. Indeed, an explicit intention of the 1986 reforms 
was to remove poor families from the tax rolls by the simple expedient of increasing 
both the standard deduction (from $3,670 to $5,000 over two years for married couples) 
and the personal exemption (from $2,160 to 4,000 over three years for married cou-
ples).74 Because of these two provisions, about 2.7 million fewer poor families were 
required to pay federal income taxes than before 1986 (but they still paid Social Secu-
rity and Medicare taxes).75 This action, of course, was a major step in making work pay. 
In addition, an important bipartisan feature of the 1986 reforms was that they included 
the first expansion of the EITC since its original enactment in 1975. 
Congress again expanded the EITC as part of the huge 1990 budget deal, as we have 
seen. Not to be outdone by a Republican president, in 1993 President Clinton pushed 
through yet another expansion of the EITC, this one worth more to low-income working 
families than either the 1986 or the 1990 expansions. President Clinton and his aides 
explicitly tied the EITC expansion to the need to “make work pay” for mothers leaving 
welfare. Making work pay would in turn justify the strong measures both Clinton and 
Republicans were considering to encourage or even force mothers to leave welfare for 
work. Thus, created in 1975, by 1993 the EITC had enjoyed three major expansions in 
less than 20 years and by 2010 was worth well over $5,500 to a family with two chil-
dren in the maximum earning range between approximately $12,500 and $16,400.76 A 
series of reforms like this, all explicitly designed to help working families, with the big-
gest and most costly reforms tied specifically to helping mothers leaving welfare, shows 
the serious commitment federal policy makers have made to helping low-income work-
ing families. In accord with President Clinton’s frequently stated goal, the U.S. gov-
ernment has done a lot to “make work pay.” 
And we are far from exhausting the tax code provisions designed to help working 
low-income families. In 1997, a new tax credit for children was enacted on a bipartisan 
basis. When fully phased in, the provision would provide families with a $1,000 credit 
for every child in their family. But the question arose of what to do about families that 
did not have enough tax liability to claim all or even part of the credit. Ironically, the 
1986 tax reforms had removed so many low-income families from the income tax rolls 
that most of them could not receive much if any money from the child tax credit be-
cause they paid zero or very low federal income taxes. 
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Along came George Bush the Younger, elected in 2000, with his massive 2001 tax 
cut proposal. Bush and the Republican majority in Congress put tax reforms that would 
yield lower taxes for most American tax payers, especially the rich, at the top of their 
agenda. However, low-income families might lose out, as indeed they did in early drafts 
of the tax reforms written by the Bush administration and its Congressional allies. But 
thanks in large part to clever machinations by Olympia Snowe, a moderate Republican 
who was concerned about ignoring low-income families with children as the fury of 
cutting everyone else’s taxes proceeded, Republicans accepted a provision that gave 
low-income families with no tax liability a refundable credit of 15 percent (phased in 
over several years beginning at 10 percent) of earnings over $10,000 up to a maximum 
credit of $1,000 per child when fully phased-in.77 The child tax credit would provide 
families with about $25 billion per year (the 10 year cost was $172 billion) and would 
increase the incomes of the parents of more than 14 million children. In addition to 
these changes in the child tax credit, the 2001 legislation, famous for helping the rich, 
also expanded the 15 percent tax bracket for married couples, helping to reduce the tax 
penalty on marriage for middle-class families, and also created a new 10 percent bracket 
for those at the bottom of the 15 percent bracket. The 10 percent bracket would put mo-
re than $420 billion in the pocketbooks of mostly poor and low-income working fami-
lies over the next decade.78 
The combined effect of all these changes in the U.S. tax code was not only to elimi-
nate millions of low-income families from the federal tax rolls, but to increase the num-
ber of families who actually received money from the tax code because of the various 
provisions on refundability. A recent study by the nonpartisan Joint Committee on 
Taxation, the authoritative source for tax estimates for the U.S. Congress, showed that 
as a result of these refundable tax credits, by 2009 nearly a quarter of tax returns re-
ceived refunds in excess of the money they had paid into the Social Security system. In 
other words, many – perhaps even most – low-income taxpayers in America who wor-
ked during 2009 in effect paid neither federal personal income taxes nor Social Security 
and Medicare taxes because the amount withheld from their paychecks for these pro-
grams was more than offset by their returns from refundable tax credits.79 
In addition to these changes in the tax code designed to help low-income families, 
since the mid-1990s there have been legislated expansions of funding for child care, 
changes in Medicaid and other government health coverage (including enactment of the 
State Child Health Insurance Program, an entirely new program) for low-income chil-
dren that would allow mothers and children leaving welfare to retain their Medicaid 
coverage (the mother for at least one year and the children permanently). Further, in 
2002 numerous changes in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; 
formerly food stamps) proposed by President Bush and enacted by Congress made the 
SNAP benefits easier to get for low-income working families. Similarly, a series of re-
forms in the Child Support Enforcement program have led to a doubling of collections 
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since 1996 and a substantial increase in child support payments to working single moth-
ers.80 
Taken together, these work support programs have a trifecta of desirable effects –  
increasing work incentive, making work pay, and reducing child poverty. There is, as 
we have seen, no question that the European and Scandinavian nations do more to re-
lieve poverty than the U.S. Still, the U.S. strategy of encouraging or compelling more 
people to work, even at low-wage jobs, and then supplementing their income through 
the work support system, has proven to be effective in reducing poverty, especially 
among single mothers and their children. In 1991, before the U.S. welfare reform era at 
the state and federal level, poverty among children in female-headed families was over 
47 percent. By 2000, after every state had implemented welfare reform and the welfare 
rolls had fallen by well over 50 percent since the year before welfare reform was en-
acted,81 the poverty rate among children in female-headed families was down to 33 per-
cent, a drop of one-third in less than a decade, with most of the drop occurring after 
enactment of welfare reform. Even through 2008, after the recession of 2001 and the 
leading edge of the Great Recession, poverty among children in female-parent families 
was still more than 20 percent below its peak in 1991.82 Detailed analysis of income by 
source based on the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey shows that poverty fell 
primarily because mothers earnings, and especially earnings plus income from the 
EITC, increased so much. Income from welfare actually fell throughout the period.83 
The U.S. experience shows that an effective work support system can be a vital compo-
nent of an overall strategy for reducing poverty while encouraging work in capitalist 
economies. The tough U.S. work requirements for families on welfare are both justified 
and compensated by the growing generosity of the work support system. 
Privatization 
Both European and the U.S. governments have a long record of using private sector 
contractors to provide everything from office supplies, to technical assistance, to full 
program operations.84 Not surprisingly, there are claims and counter claims about 
whether private companies are more effective and cost effective in conducting employ-
ment programs than government agencies.85 There are several advantages that private 
companies could potentially have over government agencies. One of the most important 
is that it is generally much easier to fire private than government employees. Not only 
does firing allow companies to replace poor performers, but the knowledge that an em-
ployee can be easily fired is bound to have some effect on the work effort of all em-
ployees. Similarly, it is usually easier for private companies to promote and give raises 
and bonuses to their employees than it is for government agencies. 
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Another major advantage of private firms is that they are often willing to enter into 
performance contracts in which their pay is based on performance. Such contracts are 
risk-sharing arrangements in which both the private contractor and the government 
agency agree to share both the potential gains and losses produced by the program. If 
companies working under performance contracts fail, government costs are lowered. By 
contrast, if the company exceeds expectations and qualifies for bonus payments, if the 
contract is well-written, the additional contract costs to government should be more than 
covered by program savings. Another possible advantage of performance contracting is 
that companies are highly motivated to provide high-quality services because without 
good services they could lose money. A more subtle advantage of private contracts is 
that government can fire poorly performing companies more easily than they can fire or 
even transfer their own employees. Stuck with the same personnel who failed the first 
time, government programs may have a more difficult time mounting effective new 
programs.86 
Of course, there are strong denials from those who represent government, especially 
employee unions, that these potential advantages of private companies are realized in 
practice. Critics of private companies argue that the zeal for profits often leads compa-
nies to cut corners and deliver shoddy services provided by under-qualified employees 
who are not well paid. Companies can go bankrupt, and frequently do, which can leave 
government agencies in a difficult position if they suddenly lose their major source of 
service provision. Another argument is that companies make profits on the backs of the 
poor by accepting government money and then not providing high-quality services. 
Anyone who thinks these arguments against private companies are far-fetched should 
read Jason DeParle’s account of how Maximus, one of the most reputable international 
companies providing employment services, botched it’s welfare-to-work program in 
Wisconsin, and even seemed to engage in illegal practices.87 
There is little doubt that privatization is growing in the U.S. and Europe and is here 
to stay. But there is a dearth of good research information on the most important ques-
tions, including whether private contracting actually saves government money, im-
proves efficiency, delivers better and more accountable services, and avoids fraud. The 
war of anecdotes and seemingly logical arguments can go only so far. It would be a 
worthwhile investment for government to pay for high-quality research about the types 
of programs that can be effectively run by private companies, the specific types of con-
tracts that would increase the chances that government gets what it’s paying for, and the 
types of regulation and oversight that would reduce fraud and mismanagement. 
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Employment and Training Programs 
Modern, skill-based economies have all the employment problems that capitalist 
economies have always had such as recessions, an abundance of low-wage work, and 
the constant struggle to create opportunity for all, but now they have an additional prob-
lem that is a growing issue in many nations and that bears directly on the goal of balanc-
ing work activation, solidarity, and economic mobility. The additional problem can be 
summarized in one word: skills. Of course, skills have always been important to indi-
vidual success in the labor market, but in large part because of technological changes 
and innovations in business organization, the proportion of high-paying jobs with em-
ployee benefits that requires high levels of skill has increased.88 Any nation that wants 
to boost employment in jobs with good wages must figure out how to build skills in its 
workforce – and often, given the rapidly changing nature of modern economies, build 
them in individual workers more than once during their career. 
The U.S. relies on a host of institutions to provide education and training for the next 
generation and to rebuild skills among workers who have lost their jobs. Here I will 
briefly examine five elements of the U.S. approach, although I do not make any claim 
that these elements work together to create anything like a system.89 The first is what, to 
be frank, constitutes the typical path to the middle class. Children begin by doing well 
in the public or sometimes private schools, attend four-year colleges, and are then able 
to qualify for jobs that pay decent starting wages, usually accompanied by employee 
benefits such as health insurance, and provide access to job information networks and 
opportunities to move up the economic ladder. This is a tried and true path to success in 
America and western European nations and, from the perspective of solidarity, deserves 
at least one additional observation. One of the best ways to increase the economic and 
social mobility of young adults from poor families is to develop ways to get them to 
follow this first path and to emerge, usually in their early twenties at the beginning of 
their careers, with a four-year college degree. An excellent longitudinal study conducted 
at the University of Michigan shows that students from families in the bottom 20 per-
cent of income nearly quadruple their chances of making it to the top fifth of income as 
adults by earning a four-year degree.90 Equally important, they reduce their odds of 
staying in the bottom fifth like their parents by more than two-thirds. Perhaps the most 
important method of promoting this path to quality jobs is by providing funds in the 
form of grants, loans, and tax breaks to students from low-income families attending 
post-secondary institutions. In the 2008-2009 academic year, this funding, much of 
which went to students from low-income families, totaled $180.3 billion from both pub-
lic and private sources, a very considerable sum of money that constitutes one of the 
nation’s wisest investments in building skills in students from low-income families and 
thereby promoting equal opportunity.91 
The second element of the American approach to education and training is federal 
programs that provide job training for low-income workers.  The current version of the 
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biggest program is called the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). Total funding for the 
program for 2009 was about $3 billion, which most analysts agree is not nearly enough 
to help all the low-income and unemployed youth and workers who could benefit from 
training services.92 Even so, WIA programs train over 400,000 adults a year at an aver-
age cost of about $2,200 per trainee. There is good evidence from a random-assignment 
evaluation that a forerunner of the WIA, called the Job Training Partnership Act, had 
statistically significant if modest impacts by boosting earnings by 5 percent for adult 
males and around 10 percent for adult females who had been in the program as com-
pared with controls. There were, however, no statistically significant impacts on the 
earnings of youth participants.93 A second federal program, run by contractors to the 
federal government, is the Job Corps, a residential program offered in about 120 sites 
nationwide that often lasts as long as a year and can cost up to $25,000 per participant. 
A large-scale random-assignment evaluation showed that the Job Corps produced re-
spectable short-term immediate impacts on employment and earnings.94 However, a 
follow-up study on income about 4 years after youth finished the program showed a 
substantial decay in the earnings gains over time, leaving little question that the pro-
gram’s costs greatly exceed program benefits over the long term. 
A third element of the employment and training system is the U.S. Employment Ser-
vice (ES). Established in 1933, ES is the oldest cog in the U.S. approach to training, job 
matching, and job search. Annually about 19 million people register with the ES for job 
search and more than 200,000 employers report about 7 million job openings to ES. It is 
thought that around 19 percent of unemployed workers seeking work use ES. In addi-
tion to provides job matching services to anyone who comes through their doors, per-
haps the central mission of the ES is to help recipients of unemployment benefits find 
jobs. States are strongly committed to this mission because, as we have seen, research 
shows that effective job search and job placement can reduce unemployment spells and 
thereby reduce state expenditures on unemployment benefits. Despite these numbers 
and the importance of their mission, the ES appears to be of declining importance in 
two respects. First, its budget has been cut by about half in constant dollars since 1984. 
Second, one of the most useful functions of the ES was to maintain an internet-based 
job-matching service, but in recent years the federal agency responsible for the ES has 
withdrawn its support for the job-matching service. As a result, private industry and the 
national organization that represents state workforce agencies have created their own 
internet-based job-matching system called JobCentral-NLX in which all states now or 
soon will participate.95 Thus, although there is a clear need for an agency that can coor-
dinate the various components of the U.S. approach to helping job seekers, the ES does 
not appear to play that role now and, given its funding problems, seems unlikely to play 
this role in the future. 
In addition to these three approaches to education and job training, a fourth category 
is a diverse and often innovative set of training programs that are designed and con-
ducted largely by state and local officials. One of the more remarkable programs in this 
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category is Project QUEST conducted in San Antonio, Texas. Often involving adults for 
as much as 18 months, the program worked closely with local businesses to identify 
jobs for which trainees could qualify and then built their training programs to match the 
requirements of these jobs. Good but not random-assignment studies found that QUEST 
increased income of participants by between $5,000 and $7,500 per year.96 An equally 
impressive state program was implemented in Portland, Oregon with parents on welfare. 
The project involved skills training for jobs available in the local economy and job 
search assistance after the completion of job training. A hallmark of the program was 
close cooperation between welfare officials, officials running the program, and local 
community colleges. A large random-assignment evaluation showed that the program 
increased employment by about 11 percentage points and increased earnings by 35 per-
cent.97 Yet another fascinating program, called Career Academies, was conducted in 
nine high schools around the U.S. The academies were organized as small schools 
within larger schools in which between 150 and 200 students took their classes together 
for the last 3 or 4 years of high school. A second major part of the intervention was that 
the academies featured a curriculum built around both academic subjects and technical 
subjects combined with real experiences in local businesses so that students could have 
work-based learning opportunities. A random assignment evaluation that followed stu-
dents for 8 years following their expected high school graduation found that young men 
in the experimental group had earnings nearly $30,000 greater over 8 years than control 
boys. Boys who had been in the program were also 33 percent more likely to be mar-
ried, an effect that may have been due in large part to their increased income and conse-
quent desirability as a spouse and father.98 
The fifth element of the American approach to education and training is community 
colleges. There are over a thousand community colleges in the U.S. with a total enroll-
ment of 6.2 million students (about 35 percent of all post-secondary students). These 
institutions, which have lower tuition than four-year colleges, enroll a wide diversity of 
students and a much higher proportion of poor and minority students than four-year 
colleges.99 Research shows that students who complete a two-year degree do in fact 
considerably upgrade their skills and increase their income significantly. Men with two-
year degrees are estimated to earn about 15 percent more than their peers without de-
grees, while women increase their earnings by an impressive 48 percent by earning a 
two-year degree.100 But the dropout rates are exceptionally high and the benefit of at-
tending community college to most dropouts is close to zero unless they have completed 
at least a full year. If the dropout problem could be solved, community colleges could 
become an even more central link in the American attempt to promote educational op-
portunity and to reduce the fraction of workers receiving low wages.  
In addition to this sprawling system of education and training supported in large part 
by public funds, many private businesses in the U.S. offer training to their employees. 
One of the most studied types of business training is apprenticeships in which workers 
take academic courses while working full time and acquiring experience and skills on 
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the job. Research shows that employees who complete apprenticeship training receive 
an earnings boost that can be even greater than that provided by two-year community 
colleges, but there are very few registered apprenticeships in the U.S. and the federal 
government spends only $20 million helping to promote and register them.101 Other 
types of training by employers add modestly to worker wages, but provide a substantial 
return on investment to employers.102 
There is not much for European governments to learn from the American system of 
education and training. American universities, especially graduate schools, continue to 
provide some of the best education in the world, but the rest of the world, including or 
even especially Europe, have caught up with or surpassed the U.S. on most education 
measures. Similarly, there is little in the approach that the U.S. takes to training for Eu-
rope to emulate. Certain elements of the approach to training are successful in some 
locations, and there are many good ideas such as apprenticeships, job search assistance, 
and many of the two-year programs at community colleges that might inform training 
policy in other nations, but the western European nations already employ similar ap-
proaches. 
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that education and training are the lifeblood 
of modern economies. There is little doubt that the U.S. will continue to reform its edu-
cational system and to invest huge resources in order to improve its somewhat stagnate 
world position. In addition, both the European nations and the U.S. need to continue 
their effort to find ways to help people who have limited education and skills improve 
both. Making progress in promoting opportunity and solidarity rests in large measure on 
better employment and training programs. Progress to date is moderate at best. 
A Workforce Agency 
Government agencies responsible for administering a nation’s workforce programs have 
a vital role to play in work activation policy. There are variations across the agencies 
that currently administer the workforce programs, but their most important duties are to 
enroll benefit recipients into a program, to assess their labor-market preparation, to en-
gage them in a work preparation program, to provide the assistance and motivation nec-
essary to help recipients complete their program, to help them find a job, and to follow-
up with needed help after recipients have started work. Few agencies provide follow-up 
services once a recipient has been placed, but the rate of job loss, especially for former 
welfare recipients, indicates that follow-up is sorely needed. 
Arguably the most important program offered by workforce agencies is job search, a 
program in which the workforce agency helps recipients develop a resume, apply for 
jobs, and go for interviews. Especially when working with welfare recipients who do 
not have a strong work record, these programs often involve a few days of training in 
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which recipients learn how to prepare their resume, how to dress for job interviews, and 
the importance of soft skills such as getting along with peers, following instructions, 
being respectful to supervisors, and showing up every day and on time. Some of the 
programs require recipients to apply for and interview for a specific number of jobs 
each week or month and to show evidence that they have complied with the require-
ment. 
Job markets are not perfect. There are firms that want workers with certain character-
istics that sometimes have trouble finding them. In the U.S. and Europe, government 
workforce agencies have often helped match potential workers with employers, a ser-
vice that has value for both the employee and the employer. Workforce agencies that 
consistently perform this job-matching function come to be relied on by employers. 
Employers are especially appreciative if they can tell the workforce agency what type of 
worker they need and then are given contacts with potential employees who do in fact 
meet their requirements. But interviews with researchers and administrators at work-
force agencies leave the impression that almost everyone agrees that workforce agencies 
could do a better job of helping match potential employees – including those from both 
unemployment and welfare programs – with employers. If this were done well, it could 
improve the efficiency of the job market, save employers money, increase the income of 
program participants, and save taxpayer dollars as well.  
Problems of Balancing Work and Solidarity 
The citizens of Western democracies have been willing to tax themselves to provide 
assistance to those who have been left behind by many previous societies and by many 
other nations in the world today. Some of the solidarity programs are based on insur-
ance principles, but most are financed in whole or in part out of taxes collected by gov-
ernment and represent transfers from the better-off to the worse off. In this broad con-
text, the recent emphasis on work activation by the European nations and the U.S. 
represents a coming to terms with financial realities. The evidence reviewed in this pa-
per shows that every nation examined has adopted work activation policies and that they 
have often been successful in increasing employment among able-bodied adults, includ-
ing some formerly considered too old, too frail, or too troubled to work. Remarkably, 
the poverty data shown in Figure 1 indicate that, despite the new emphasis on work ac-
tivation policies, European solidarity policies are still effective in greatly reducing pov-
erty while U.S. solidarity polices are less effective in reducing poverty but still reduce 
poverty by over one-third. Even so, systems designed by humans, especially when they 
are relatively new, have flaws. With an eye toward fixing these flaws, I next review 
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several of the most important in the programs that are still undergoing change and de-
velopment to increase the number of people working while ensuring the wellbeing of 
workers and their families. 
Too Few Jobs 
The Netherlands and the U.S. provide two fascinating stories about how many jobs a 
nation’s economy can produce. The U.S. job machine jumped into gear following the 
recession of 1982. However, job growth during the 1980s, which could probably be 
called moderate, paled by comparison with the rapid growth of the 1990s. Between the 
mild recession of 1991 and the recession of 2001, the American economy added 24.3 
million jobs103 and the employment/population ratio zoomed from 61.4 to 64.3.104 Since 
the recession of 2001, however, jobs have become a serious problem in the U.S. As we 
saw in Figure 4a, by 2009 the U.S. E/P ratio was lower than the ratio for Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the UK. It was not only the Great Recession that began in 2007 that 
caused the American job machine to sputter, however, because the U.S. has had a lower 
E/P ratio than both the Netherlands and the U.K. since 2001. Thus, the U.S. has already 
had an 8-year period (and projections are for at least another two or three years of mod-
est job growth)105 when many families could not find work. These developments raise 
important questions about the strategy of emphasizing jobs, even low-wage jobs, and 
expanding family income by providing cash and in-kind benefits from the work support 
system. Both the EITC and the child tax credit, two of the most lucrative work supports, 
can boost income only when people have earnings. They effectively increase income as 
more and more people find low-wage work, but they double down on family losses 
when unemployment expands because families lose both their earnings and the pay-
ments through the tax system that were based on earnings. 
Recessions 
The most extreme cases of job shortages occur during recessions, one of the most seri-
ous flaws in capitalist economies. According to OECD data, between 1960 and 2010, 
the German economy had negative growth in 25 percent of the quarters, the Netherlands 
in 19 percent, the U.K. in 20 percent, and the U.S. in 14 percent.106 Clearly, despite 
modern theory and practice of using fiscal and monetary policy to regulate economic 
growth, the economies of some of leading Western democracies are in recession an av-
erage of nearly 20 percent of the time. Even the U.S., which until recently had the best 
record of avoiding negative growth over the four decades, was in recession 14 percent 
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of the time – and now is trying to leave the worst recession since the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. 
All recessions are not created equal, but the hallmark of every recession is that un-
employment increases. Unemployment for workers is usually accompanied by financial 
problems. This is especially the case when families carry large debt loads because los-
ing income in the context of debt can lead to bankruptcy with possible long-term conse-
quences for a family’s credit. Even if families can avoid bankruptcy, unemployment 
typically causes several levels of misery, often starting with families being forced to 
reduce or eliminate luxuries such as eating out and entertainment, but then progressing 
to reduced spending on necessary purchases such as food and clothing, selling items of 
value, including the family’s home, reduced family investment in education, and in-
creasing debt. Particularly hard hit are those without unemployment insurance, espe-
cially in households with only one earner. Desperation can set in quickly when a house-
hold loses all its earnings and unemployment benefits run out. In some cases, the conse-
quences include entire families losing their home and moving in with relatives or 
friends. 
Recessions underline the tension between the growing demand for work activation 
and the desire to promote solidarity. If there is always difficulty knowing where to draw 
the line between expecting work and identifying people who are not able to work stead-
ily, the line certainly shifts to include more people on the nonwork side during reces-
sions. Some people do find jobs during recessions, but there are many people who either 
cannot find jobs at all or take much longer to find them. The two major tools the West-
ern democracies have developed to help people during recessions are unemployment 
insurance and welfare. The duration of unemployment insurance varies across the West-
ern democracies from 26 weeks to well over a year, but eventually coverage ends (see 
Appendix). At this point, the second tool – welfare – becomes available. The trick is to 
provide both unemployment and welfare without giving up on the idea that people 
should do everything possible to work. Even so, the work programs must have the fle-
xibility to be implemented with more compassion during recessions. 
Many critics of the post-welfare reform regime in the U.S. are arguing that the pro-
gram has been a bust during the Great Recession (and to a lesser extent, during the re-
cession of 2001). The critics have a point. Figure 7 shows that as the unemployment rate 
increased rapidly after the official onset of the recession in December 2007, the number 
of people receiving both food stamps and unemployment insurance payments increased 
dramatically. Of course, this relationship between rising benefits from welfare programs 
and rising unemployment is exactly what the welfare programs were designed to ac-
complish. By contrast, the number of people on TANF hardly rose at all and in some 
months actually declined in some states – all during the worst recession since the Great 
Depression. 
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Figure 7
Unemployment Rate and Number of SNAP, Unemployment Insurance, 
and TANF Recipients, 2007-2009
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Why the TANF program responded this way to rising unemployment is not clear. One 
thing that is clear, however, is that the authors of the 1996 welfare reform legislation 
anticipated that recessions would occur and that the number of people who qualify for 
cash benefits would rise during recessions. Because state governments – who are re-
sponsible for establishing the specific characteristics of the TANF program in their state 
– are given a fixed amount of annual funding to conduct TANF activities, the authors of 
the 1996 legislation reasoned that it would be difficult for states to come up with addi-
tional funds to pay for increased TANF enrollment during a recession. So they included 
a Contingency Fund that gave states additional money when unemployment or food 
stamp use increased by a specified amount. The fund was provided with $2 billion in 
guaranteed funding, thereby indicating how seriously Congress took the need for emer-
gency funds to pay additional welfare benefits for those who couldn’t find work during 
a recession. And yet, as Figure 7 shows so clearly, the Great Recession has hardly led to 
a rise in the number of families receiving TANF cash payments. Even when Congress 
enacted another pot of guaranteed funding as part of the American Reinvestment and 
Recovery Act of 2008, many states still did not provide cash welfare to additional fami-
lies. This lack of response to the Great Recession is strong evidence that the TANF pro-
gram should be reformed to help more destitute families during recessions.107 The more 
general conclusion from this episode is that balancing work programs with solidarity 
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programs requires the Western democracies to have flexible welfare programs that 
make access to benefits less difficult during times of economic distress. 
Recessions represent a kind of acid test of finding a balance between strong work ac-
tivation policy and solidarity. The U.S. is failing this test in the Great Recession. 
Low Wages 
Another important problem of capitalist economies is that they generate lots of low-
wage jobs that yield incomes that are difficult for a family to live on. The U.S. economy 
is especially vulnerable to this problem. Although recent research by Richard Burk-
hauser and his colleagues shows that the charge that only the rich have done well in 
recent decades in the U.S. is inaccurate because, at least during the economic expansion 
of the 1990s, the entire distribution of family incomes moved up, the wage data at the 
bottom of the distribution are nonetheless discouraging (Figure 8).108 Wages at the 10th 
percentile, for example, did improve nicely during the 1990s, but they managed only to 
return to the level of 1979. Thus, in effect, U.S. wages at the bottom of the distribution 
have not improved in three decades while wages further up the distribution have en-
joyed improvement, modest in the middle and large to very large at the top. Families 
with low wages boosted their income by sending additional workers into the economy 
or working more hours. 
Although Europe also has a problem with low-wage jobs, recent studies indicate that 
European countries generally have fewer low-wage workers than the U.S. Based on an 
elaborate study involving both survey data and case studies sponsored by the Russell 
Sage Foundation,109 Gerhard Bosch reports extensive data on low-wage employment in 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. Defining low-
wages as two-thirds of the median hourly gross wage, Bosch finds that Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the U.K. have an average of about 20 percent of their employees 
working for low wages as compared with 25 percent for the U.S.110 France and Den-
mark, with only 11.1 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively, of employees receiving low 
wages, offer an even greater contrast with the U.S. Bosch attributes the differences be-
tween the European nations and the U.S. to a complex web of factors. Roughly, he and 
his colleges believe that employers in Europe use innovative forms of work organiza-
tion, invest more in training, and employ newer technologies, all of which boost the 
productivity of workers, thereby permitting higher wages. Based on case studies of call 
centers, food processing, retail outlets, hospitals, and hotels in all these countries, Bosch 
and his colleagues argue that collective bargaining agreements also play an important 
role in minimizing the number of low-wage jobs. 
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Figure 8 
Trend in Real Hourly Wages at Selected Points in Wage Distribution 
in the United States, 1979-2007
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The U.S. minimum wage may be a factor here. Although the minimum wage was in-
creased by Congress in 2007, it has not kept up with inflation over the years, let alone 
with measures of economic growth such as GDP per capita.111 There is a long-running 
battle among economists about whether increasing the minimum wage reduces job 
growth because employers cannot afford to hire people at a higher minimum wage. 
There may be some agreement that very modest increases – perhaps enough to keep up 
with inflation – would not have a major impact on jobs, but even here there likely would 
be some disagreement. This is an issue on which conservatives strongly assert that a 
higher minimum wage destroys jobs while liberals assert with equal fervor that the mi-
nimum wage can be raised without harming job creation.112 
Conflicts over the minimum wage, however, must be considered in light of the fact 
that many low-wage workers, including most mothers leaving welfare, find jobs that 
pay well above the minimum wage. Surveys of mothers leaving welfare by several 
states in the years after the 1996 welfare reforms showed that, in say 1999, the average 
wage was roughly $7.15 per hour at a time when the minimum wage was only $5.15.113 
Some economists argue, however, that raising the minimum wage can have an effect on 
wages above the minimum due to a kind of domino effect in which raising the minimum 
has impacts all along the low-wage distribution. Again, whether this claim is accurate 
does not seem to be clarified by research as shown by the reviews cited previously. 
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An important issue raised by the debate over low wages is whether there could be a 
supply side effect on low wages if workers who fill these positions had more education. 
Labor economist Gary Burtless examined this issue in his 1990 edited book A Future of 
Lousy Jobs? Burtless argued that if low-wage employees had more education and skills, 
they would be able to raise their productivity and employers would be willing to pay 
them higher wages.114 Additional training as a strategy for boosting wages resonates 
with the findings of the Russell Sage study reported by Bosch and his colleagues com-
paring low-wage employment in the U.S. and Europe. Even if this claim is true, how-
ever, it is not obvious how the U.S. or European nations could boost average education 
levels of those at the bottom. Both the U.S. and Europe have been trying for many years 
with only modest success, especially in the U.S. (see the section above on “Employment 
and Training Programs”). As we will see, a key here may be relying on employer-
provided training, perhaps with government subsidies, rather than training sponsored by 
government. As James Heckman argues, employers know exactly the skills they need 
their employees to have and tailor their training to precisely these skills, thereby pro-
moting efficiency while boosting skills and wages.115 
In the end, it seems likely that some mix of collective bargaining agreements, more 
efficient forms of work organization, greater use of technology, higher levels of educa-
tion, and employer training hold the answer to improving wages at the bottom of the 
distribution. As always, the particular mix is likely to vary from country to country. But 
it seems clear that low wages are another problem that is not being solved by market 
forces. Government intervention is a necessary ingredient of solving the low-wage 
problem as in fact many of the European nations have already demonstrated. 
Disconnected Mothers 
As we have seen, a problem with strong work requirements in welfare programs that has 
become more and more obvious in the U.S. is that many mothers lose their welfare 
benefit but are not steadily employed. Any nation that includes full-check sanctions that 
deprive recipients of their entire cash benefit runs the risk of increasing destitution. 
Clearly, if recipients lose their cash benefits and have no earnings, they are likely to 
have difficulty supporting themselves and their children. As Rebecca Blank and Brian 
Kovak have shown, based on the Current Population Survey, between 1990 and 2005 
the percentage of all single mothers who had no cash welfare and no earnings increased 
from 9.9 to 20.0, representing a little more than a doubling of single mothers who are at 
great risk of becoming destitute.116 Mothers can respond by employing various strate-
gies identified by Edin and Lein under the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
Program in the U.S., such as living with someone who has an income like a boyfriend or 
relatives, getting money and goods from friends or relatives, and obtaining illegal in-
come from selling drugs and similar activities. These strategies, however, tend to yield 
income that is unreliable and unstable and may pose risks as great as deprivation it-
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self.117 The number rose, at least in part, because mothers who would have been on wel-
fare and had a steady stream of cash income – modest to be sure, but steady nonetheless 
– before welfare reform were no longer on welfare. 
Sanction policy undoubtedly plays a role here. To paraphrase Bruce Meyer, sanctions 
are not benign. In an early study, Rebecca London used data from the 1990 Survey of 
Income and Program Participation to trace the impact of partial and full sanctions on the 
living arrangements of welfare mothers. She found that among other effects, following 
the loss of their welfare cash benefit, many mothers were no longer able to maintain a 
separate household. As a result, they often moved in with their mothers.118 Some might 
interpret this outcome as a step away from personal responsibility and financial inde-
pendence. Similarly, a longitudinal study of welfare mothers followed for six years be-
ginning in 1997 found that 9 percent of them became “chronically” (at least 25 percent 
of the time) disconnected (without cash welfare or earnings).119  
Perhaps the greatest risk of sanctions policy is that when families that do not work 
lose their cash benefit, they could fall into deep poverty and experience hardships such 
as food deprivation, termination of household utilities, and housing loss. A study by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture showed that between 1990 and 2004, families in deep 
poverty defined as below half the poverty level experienced a notable decline in total 
household income from all sources.120 Using data from the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation and controlling for inflation, the authors found that these households, 
disproportionately headed by women, had total income of $1,033 in 1990, $805 in 2001, 
and $825 in 2004 (a 20 percent decline since 1990; incomes in all three years expressed 
in 2000 dollars). By far the biggest source of the decline was the fall in cash welfare 
benefits from $369 in 1990 to $97 in 2004, a decline of nearly 75 percent. This study 
does not show that sanctions were a cause of people falling into deep poverty, but a rea-
sonable conclusion from the studies reviewed here is that a substantial number of fami-
lies lose their cash welfare benefit due in large part to sanctions and that the adult in 
many of these families does not retain permanent employment. It is certain that what-
ever the cause of families with children falling into deep poverty, they were substan-
tially worse off in 2004 than in 1990. Census data show that there was actually a slight 
decline in the number of mother-headed families in deep poverty after welfare reform in 
1996,121 but those who were in deep poverty were worse off after welfare reform than 
they had been before welfare reform. 
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Conclusion 
The Western democracies have developed many effective policies and programs to 
temper the malign effects of capitalism. These policies and programs have always rep-
resented a balance between the desire of citizens to show solidarity with those who have 
trouble working and the need to encourage work which, after all, is the source of the 
money that transforms compassion into actual benefits. Faced with increasing difficulty 
in financing their solidarity programs and fighting stiff international competition for 
jobs, over the past two decades or so there has been a gradual shift in most of these na-
tions to work activation policies that aim to increase the number of people working and 
to reduce the number of people dependent on government benefits. To a large extent, as 
work activation policies have increased the fraction of adults with jobs, poverty in all 
these nations has declined. Although not examined here, data from the Scandinavian 
countries also show that work activation and solidarity can be reconciled.122 Financial 
necessity may push the Western democracies further in the direction of work activation 
policies to exert still more control over increases in government spending and to in-
crease tax revenues. As these changes take place, the Western democracies have a lot to 
learn from each other’s experience. Besides the fundamental finding of basic compati-
bility between work activation and solidarity, several additional lessons already seem 
apparent. Three of the most important are that innovative forms of work organization, 
investments in worker training, investments in efficiency-promoting technologies, and 
collective bargaining agreements can minimize the number of low-wage jobs; that tigh-
ter work requirements in welfare and employment programs and work incentives in dis-
ability programs have potential to increase work levels; and that even low-wage work 
can both increase work incentives and reduce poverty when combined with work sup-
ports such as wage supplements, child care, and other in-kind benefits. If these countries 
can continue finding new ways to increase work without undue sacrifices in solidarity 
before they bankrupt themselves, both the work and solidarity traditions can be main-
tained and even improved. 
 
  
APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1 
Overview of Selected Social Programs in Germany, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S.: Welfare Benefits 
       
  Germany Netherlands United Kingdom United States 
Basic Principles • Raise standards of living and help people 
attain independence from social assistance 
• Provide financial assistance for citizens who 
cannot support self or family, aimed at restoring 
self-sufficiency 
• Tax-financed income support for means-tested 
non-full time workers 
• Help needy families achieve self-sufficiency 
• Monthly cash assistance to means-tested 
families who are completing work-related  
activities 
• Block grant program to states 
Conditions • Unlimited duration 
• Citizens or citizens of most other EU states 
residing in Germany 
• No age condition, although those over age 65 
receive separate monies 
• Must engage in job search/placement  
assistance 
• Unlimited duration 
• Must be Netherlands resident 
• Must be over age 18 
• Recipients under age 57.5 must look for work 
(sanctions imposed if beneficiary does not look 
for work) 
• Unlimited duration 
• No nationality requirements, but claimants 
living outside the U.K. for two years before claim 
must satisfy habitual residence test 
• Must be age 16 
• Persons capable of working should claim 
unemployment; willingness to work is not a 
condition for income support 
• Recipients must work as soon as they are job 
ready 
• Lifetime limit of 5 years in program (with some 
exceptions) 
• Families must cooperate with child support 
enforcement 
Resources Taken 
into Account 
• All income including other social benefits and 
most assets for claimant and spouse (or  
partner) 
• All resources regardless of nature and origin 
except for assets up to € 5,455 for a single 
person (double that for a couple) 
• Most income resources, social security  
benefits, and pension are taken into account 
• Varies by state, but most have both income 
and asset tests 
Benefits • Regular payments at standard rates in various 
amounts for different family members including 
allowances for housing and heating 
• One-time benefits for expenses including 
clothing, birth, home furnishing including appli-
ances, and clothing for multi-day school trips 
• Additional benefits at beginning of school year 
for supplies 
• Regular payments to all people who meet 
means-tested requirement 
• Extra payments to those with exceptional 
needs 
• Some assistance given to those with income 
just above social minimum to be used for  
"incidental but necessary expenditure," i.e. 
school trips, furniture, home appliances 
• Regular personal allowances with premiums 
for families, pensioners, disability (at various 
levels), and caregivers 
• Extra cold weather payment of € 29 for means-
tested families with child who is disabled or 
under age 5 when average temperature is at or 
below 0°C for seven consecutive days during 
the winter. 
• Monthly cash payments 
• Transitional services and job training or job 
placement help 
• Monthly cash assistance to means-tested 
families who are completing work-related  
activities 
Average Rates 
(Monthly) 
Calculated from personal allowance added to 
housing and heating assistance:  
• Single Person: € 359 
• Couple with two children: € 1,148 
• Single parent with two children: € 990 
• Additional housing and heating payment 
depends on the number of people. 3 people 
receive € 524 
• Single person: € 615.15 
• Married couple with or without children:  
€ 1,230.32 
• Single Parent: € 861.22 
• Single persons and single parents can get an 
additional allowance up to € 246.06 from the 
municipality 
• Single Person: € 645 
• Couple with two children: € 1,602 
• Single parent with two children: € 1,389 
• Benefits vary widely by state--as of 2004 
monthly benefits for a single parent family of 
three ranged from $170 in Mississippi to $709 in 
Vermont 
Associated Rights 
and Integration 
Measures 
• Assistance with visiting social services and a 
job offer when reasonable given recipient's 
restrictions 
• Comprehensive health insurance 
• Costs of housing and heating covered 
• Plan of action for job interviews made at outset
• Some of part-time earnings not taken into 
account to stimulate finding employment 
• Beneficiaries under health insurance act pay 
6.5% of old-age pension and 4.4 % of wages or 
supplementary pensions 
• Nominal premium 
• Housing cost theoretically covered by general 
rate (rent assistance may be available) 
• Some income disregarded to encourage work 
• Personal advisor meetings compulsory for lone 
parents to help with job placement 
• Development of system to make sure people 
are better-off working 
• Continuation of benefits for some duration 
after starting work 
• Rent supports 
• Free National Health Service prescriptions, 
dental treatment, eyesight tests and glasses 
vouchers, help with travel costs to doctor, free 
milk for pregnant women 
• Participation in work programs is required for 
entry  
• States help with work training and work  
placement 
• Recipients often eligible for other national 
programs like food stamps, housing assistance, 
etc. TANF offices may help enroll people in 
these other services 
Source: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do?lang=en; TANF information from 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/opa/fact_sheets/tanf_factsheet.html; Benefit range from http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32598.pdf.   
  
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2 
Overview of Selected Social Programs in Germany, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S.: Family Benefits 
       
  Germany Netherlands United Kingdom United States 
Basic Principles • Universal tax-funded system with fixed tax refunds 
of parental income 
• No variation with income or age of child 
• Additional child-raising allowance for non-working 
or part-time workers who care for child during first 
14 months 
• Tax-funded system with universal fixed amount 
and additional benefits for those with low family 
income 
• Tax-funded system with universal fixed benefits 
and additional tax credit for those with low family 
income 
• No universal transfer program 
• Universal child tax credit 
• Earned income tax credit (EITC) for means-tested 
working parents 
Conditions • Child must be under age 18 generally, age 21 if the 
child is unemployed, age 25 if the child is in  
vocational/higher education, and no age limit if the 
child must be cared for due to disability beginning 
before age 25 
• Child must be under 18 
• Child must live with the parent in the EU 
• Child must be under 16 or in approved training up 
to age 20 
• Child must live in the U.K. with parent or parent 
living in the U.K. must be contributing to costs of 
child-raising 
• Child must be 16 or younger for child tax credit; 
under 19 or a student under 24 for EITC 
• For EITC household income could not be above 
$40,295 for a single parent with two children (2009) 
• For child tax credit, must generally be U.S. Citizen 
or Resident Alien and must be related to the  
beneficiary  
•For both EITC and child tax credit, the child must 
have lived with the beneficiary for at least half of the 
past year 
Benefit Levels • € 164 monthly for first and second children, € 170 
monthly for third child, and € 195 monthly for fourth 
and subsequent children 
• Child-raising allowance is 67% of income of parent 
claiming benefit amounting to no less than € 300 per 
month and no more than € 1,800 per month 
• € 64.99 quarterly up to age 5; € 78.92 quarterly for 
ages 6-11; and € 92.85 quarterly for ages 12-18 
• Additional benefits (€ 82.83 monthly for the first 
child, € 25.43 monthly for the second child, € 15.00 
monthly for the third child, € 8.75 monthly for the 
fourth child, and € 4.17 monthly for the fifth and 
subsequent children) are available for those with 
household income below threshold dependent on the 
number of children 
• € 101 monthly for eldest child; € 67 monthly for 
subsequent children 
• Additional means-tested (high limit of £ 50,000) 
tax credit dependent on child's age up to a maximum 
of £ 2,300 
• Child tax credit up to $1000 per child 
• Maximum EITC benefit for 2 children is $5,028 
• Child tax credit benefits begin to phase out for 
family income over $110, 000 for two-parent family 
• EITC begins to phase-out at $16,420 for married 
parents 
Other Benefits • Entitlement to unpaid leave from work to raise 
child under age 3 
• Supplementary means-tested benefit for employed 
parents 
• Additional child care allowance if parents are both 
employed 
• Amount of childcare award depends on household 
composition, type of care, expense of care, and 
income of parents up to a maximum of € 6.10 per 
hour 
• Means-tested benefit of € 584 for new mothers 
• Means-tested education allowance of € 35 weekly 
payable to 16-19 year-olds participating in full-time 
education or training 
• Large employers must allow up to 12 weeks unpaid 
leave to care for newborn children or dependents  
        
Sources: Child tax credit information from http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=106182,00.html; Family and medical leave from http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/benefits-leave/fmla.htm; EITC 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96466,00.html. 
 
 
  
 
Appendix Table 3 
Overview of Selected Social Programs in Germany, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S.: Other Programs 
       
  Germany Netherlands United Kingdom United States 
Housing Support • Transfer program with various ceilings • Means-tested households must pay 
minimum amount, government transfers 
cover 100% up to a "quaility limit" and 
75% up to a ceiling 
• 100% of housing covered by government transfers for 
those below an income limit, benefit tapers off up to ceiling 
• Public Housing--government-owned housing for means-
tested, elderly, and disabled 
• Housing Choice Voucher Program--means-tested; provides 
voucher to help cover the cost of rent 
Food Support • No specific programs • No specific programs • No specific programs • Program for all means-tested (adults without children  
generally must work), provides money for non-alcohol food and 
drinks on debit-card 
• Free and Reduced School Meals--federal cash subsidies to 
schools to provide (free meals for children from families with 
incomes below 130% of poverty, reduced for children from 
families with incomes below 185% of poverty) to provide free 
and reduced-price breakfasts and lunches to means-tested 
students (note that all in-school meals are subsidized to some 
level) 
• Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)--Federal grants to states 
for food support programs for means-tested pregnant and 
postpartum women and their children up to age 5 
• Program to subsidize meals and snacks for children in  
preschool programs 
Childcare • German government provides  
significant grants to provide preschool 
education--it generally is not free, but is 
heavily subsidized 
• Means-tested families can often get 
free or reduced rates at preschools, but 
36% of children from lowest income 
families do not attend kindergarten 
(ages 3-6 in Germany) 
• Effort to roll out innovative programs 
on trial basis for study 
• Many schools are private but all 
receive full public funding, childcare 
heavily subsidized by government and 
employers, particularly for children from 
low-income families 
• Childcare tax credit for low-income parents working at 
least 16 hours a week 
• Childcare is a universal right from age 4 
• Dependent and Child Care Credit--tax credit for care pur-
chased for spouse, child, or other dependent so that benificiary 
can work or look for work, can get credit of 35% of expenses up 
to $3,000 for 1 person's care, $6,000 for 2 or more 
• Head Start and Early Head Start--grants to local public and 
private schools to provide comprehensive child development 
services to means-tested children before entering kindergarten-
-Early Head Start is for those under age 3 
• Child Care and Development Block Grants--Child Care and 
Development Fund (CCDF) disbursed $7 billion in 2009 for 
subsidized child care to provide means-tested families with 
vouchers to send their children to child care 
• Several additional programs specifically for the disabled 
Workforce  
Training/Education 
• Strong emphasis on vocational  
training as part of public education and 
use of apprenticeship programs 
• € 1.5 billion annually given to help 
disadvantaged workers complete 
vocational training of some sort 
• Government is responsible for helping 
youth and unemployed workers achieve 
a level of training to allow for  
employability 
• Further training is at expense of 
employer and employee (may be tax-
deductible) 
• There are a variety of vocational training programs aimed 
at youth and adults, including the Work Based Learning for 
Adults program targeted at the long-term unemployed in 
particular 
• The New Deal for Young People, part of the welfare 
system, is aimed at getting people aged 18-24 who have 
been unemployed for six months or longer into a subsidized 
job, a place on the Environment Task Force, volunteer 
sector employment, or a full-time vocational or training 
program--those who refuse any of the work options face 
welfare benefit sanctions 
• The New Deal for Long-Term Unemployed (ND25+) is for 
workers over 25 who have been unemployed for 18 months 
or longer--employers recieve a subsidy for employing them-
-includes some provision for vocational training 
• Many workforce training programs 
• Department of Labor Workforce Investment Act provides for a 
Workforce Investment Board in every state--core services are 
available to everyone with specialized services for displaced 
workers 
• Deparment of Education spents approximately $1.9 billion 
annually in three areas: Adult Education and Literacy, Career 
and Technical Education, and Community Colleges 
• Provisions in tax code to subsidize employment and training, 
especially for low-income workers 
        
Sources: HCVP/Public Housing, http://breadforthecity.blogspot.com/2008/07/public-housing-vs-section-8-brief.html; Dependent care, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=106189,00.html; SNAP, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/rules/Legislation/about.htm; School Lunch Program, http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/; WIC, http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/; Head Start, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ohs/; Child Care and Development Block 
Grant,  http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/nonpublic/childcare.html and  http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ccb/ccdf/index.htm; Job Training, http://www.policyalmanac.org/economic/job_training.shtml; Non-US Housing Data, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39617987_1_1_1_1,00.html; German Childcare Programs, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/35/37424318.pdf; Netherlands Childcare, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/13/1942338.pdf; UK Childcare, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/17/1942377.pdf; Netherlands Workforce, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0804048s/nl0804049q.htm; German Vocational 
Program, http://www.bmbf.de/pub/germanys_vocational_education_at_a_glance.pdf; UK Vocational Training, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-013.pdf.       
  
 
 
 
Appendix Table 4 
Overview of Selected Social Programs in Germany, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S.: Sickness/Short-term Disability 
       
  Germany Netherlands United Kingdom United States 
Basic Principles • Compulsory social insurance with benefits as 
percentage of income 
• Continuation of wages and salaries 
• Continuation of payment by employer for two 
years 
• Compulsory social insurance with flat rate 
benefits 
• Statutory sick pay by employer 
See appendix table 5 
Beneficiaries • Employees  
• Possibility of voluntary insurance 
• Income under € 44, 100 for employees  
privately insured, € 48,600 for others 
• All employees under age 65 • All employees subject to employer coverage 
• Social benefits for all employed, self-
employed, and unemployed  
  
Conditions • Doctor certified incapacity for work from day 4 
of illness 
• Employee must stay at home until contact from 
inspector 
• Inspector must be allowed to make home visits 
(beneficiary must facilitate own recovery) 
• Employee must notify implementation  
institution of whereabouts within 24 hours 
• Keep appointment with medical insurance 
office of implementation institution 
• Support based on doctor certification and 
"work capability assessment" 
• Various earnings and tax payment minimums 
in base period (three previous years) 
• 3 day waiting period 
  
Benefit Levels Employer: 
• Continuation of payment for manual and white-
collar workers for 6 weeks 
“Social Insurance” 
• For sickness--70% of normal salary but not 
exceeding 90% of the net salary 
• Up to 1 year--Wages and income from normal 
work (during last 3 months) as much as is 
subject to contribution. After one year,  
adjustment for pensions 
Employer: 
• Continued payment of 70% of wages up to 
maximum of € 185.46 per day 
• Industrial boards can increase the percentage 
with minister's approval 
“Social Insurance” 
• 70% of wages up to maximum of € 185.46 per 
day 
Employer: 
• Standard rate is € 92 per week 
• No benefit for earnings less than € 111 
“Social Insurance” 
• If under 25 years of age, € 60 per week and if 
over 25, € 75 per week for first 13 weeks 
• € 75 per week with additional € 30 per week 
for those capable of work and additional € 36 for 
those requiring support  
  
Benefit Duration • 6 weeks for employer benefit 
• Sickness benefit limited to 78 weeks over 3-
year period for the same illness 
• 104 weeks • Employer benefits for 28 weeks 
• Social benefits in assessment phase during 
first 13 weeks; main phase thereafter 
  
Other Benefits • Maximum of 10 working days (20 for single 
parents) if child under 12 is ill and needs super-
vision or care 
• Maximum of 25 working days per year per 
insured parent (50 for single parent) 
• No maximum for dying children 
• Supplementary benefit can be claimed if 70% 
of daily wage is less than social minimum 
• Death grant for 100% of wages for one month 
• No other benefits 
  
Taxation and 
Contribution of 
Benefits 
• Employer paid benefits subject to taxation 
• Sickness insurance benefits are not 
• Employer paid benefits subject to social 
security contributions 
• Sickness insurance subject to pension  
insurance and unemployment insurance 
• Benefits subject to taxation 
• Various social insurance contributions 
• Benefits subject to taxation (for older program-
-not for lower-level of income) 
• Employer benefits treated like earnings 
  
        
Source: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do?lang=en; SSDI information from 
http://www.ssa.gov/dibplan/index.htm; SSI information from http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/11000.html#part2; SSI maximum benefit from 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/SSIamts.html; SSDI maximum from http://www.elderlawanswers.com/Elder_Info/Elder_Article.asp?id=700 
  
 
  
 
Appendix Table 5 
Overview of Selected Social Programs in Germany, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S.: Long-term Disability 
       
  Germany Netherlands United Kingdom United States 
Basic Principles • Compulsory social insurance financed by 
covered employees and some self-employed 
• Emphasis is on rehabilitation with both  
employer and employee 
• Different acts cover permanently disabled and 
those aged 17-27 
• Compulsory social insurance for employees 
and self-employed with flat-rate long-term 
benefit 
• Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is tax-
revenue supported program for means-tested 
disabled and elderly  
• Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is 
compulsory social insurance with payment 
based on estimated lifetime income  
Beneficiaries • Same as sickness 
• No compulsory insurance for workers making 
under € 400 per month or working for less than 
2 months or 50 days per year if not pursued as 
occupation and if corresponding renumeration 
does not exceed € 400/month 
• Normal program is same as sickness 
• Permanently disabled under age of 65 who 
cannot work by age 17 or disabled after 17 and 
were students for 6 months of prior year 
• Same as sickness 
• No contributions or benefits for those with 
income under € 111 per week or self-employed 
with income under € 5,927 per year 
• SSI covers means-tested U.S. citizens over 
age 65, have a disability, or are blind 
• SSDI covers those who have worked a  
sufficient amount prior to disability, amount 
needed depends on age 
Conditions • Total incapacity pension for those unable to 
work at least 3 hours a day in the normal labor 
market  
• Partial incapacity pension for those unable to 
work at least 6 hours a day in the normal labor 
market 
• For workers who can work between 3 and 6 
hours a day, total incapacity may be received if 
there is no appropriate work 
• If a person cannot earn the same as healthy 
workers with similar training and equivalent 
skills earn at location where she most recently 
worked 
• Cause of incapacity is irrelevant 
• Incapacity for work for reasons of physi-
cal/mental illness or disability in a period of 
incapacity for work where there has been 
entitlement, or deemed entitlement, to short 
term incapacity benefit for 52 weeks 
• SSI beneficiaries must meet disability  
requirements (or be blind or over age 65) and 
meet a means-test 
• SSDI workers must meet prior work  
requirements, must not be able to work, and 
must be expected to remain in that condition for 
a year or longer 
Benefit Levels • Fully disabled receive same amount as old-
age pension 
• Partially disabled receive some percentage 
(66%) of old-age pension 
• 75% of last daily wage (for long-term fully 
disabled, less for others) up to maximum of € 
185.46 per day 
• Partially disabled receive percentage of re-
maining earning capacity up to € 185.46 per day 
• € 105 per week, additional € 18/7.65 per week 
if disability began before age 35/44 
• Extra € 62 per week for spouse over 60 or 
dependent child 
• SSI payment maximum is $674 per month for 
an individual and $1,011 for a couple  
• SSDI payment based on estimated lifetime 
income 
Benefit Duration • Temporary incapacity paid beginning in 7th 
calendar month after beginning of incapacity 
• Converted to standard pension at appropriate 
age 
• Maximum benefit of 3 years 
• Most benefits last up to age 65 • After 1 year incapacity until pension age • Benefits last as long as disability lasts 
Rehabilitation / 
Retraining 
• Benefits for rehabilitation, participation in labor 
market, and supplementary benefits exist 
• Employers can receive contribution reduction 
for employees over age 50 
• Employers who hire a person aged 55 and 
over who has been unemployed for at least 52 
weeks can receive compensation for wage costs
• Any employer who employs a disabled worker 
or assigns them to a more suitable position can 
receive compensation for all costs involved or 
facilities to maintain, restore, or improve a 
disabled person's capacity for work 
• Facilities may be granted to help improve living 
conditions 
• Preventative health care, rehabilitation, and 
therapy provided by national health service 
• Vocational assessment, rehabilitation, and 
supported employment are provided by statute 
• Try to help people apply to food stamps and 
Medicaid 
• Have work incentives to help people return to 
some level of work while still receiving SSI/SSDI 
benefits 
Taxation and 
Contribution of 
Benefits 
• Gradual transition to deferred taxation from 
2005-2040 
• If pension is only income, amount below € 
16,460 not taxable (double that for married 
couple) 
• Pensions contribute to social security 
• Pensions subject to taxation 
• Social insurance and social security are 
deducted from benefits 
• Long-term incapacity benefit is taxable 
• Severe disability benefits are not taxable 
• No contributions to social programs 
• Some percentage of benefits are taxable 
depending on income 
Preferential 
Employment of 
Disabled 
• Cause of incapacity is irrelevant • Legislation in preparation • Discrimination is illegal (including failure to 
make reasonable accommodation) 
• Discrimination is illegal 
        
Source: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do?lang=en; Extra information about Germany and Netherlands, 
https://www.facworld.com/FacWorld.nsf/doc/nldedis/$file/dischdene.pdf 
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